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PRIVACY, POVERTY, AND BIG DATA: A MATRIX
OF VULNERABILITIES FOR POOR AMERICANS
MARY MADDEN*
MICHELE GILMAN**
KAREN LEVY ***
ALICE MARWICK****
ABSTRACT
This Article examines the matrix of vulnerabilities that low-income
people face as a result of the collection and aggregation of big data and
the application of predictive analytics. On one hand, big data systems
could reverse growing economic inequality by expanding access to
opportunities for low-income people. On the other hand, big data could
widen economic gaps by making it possible to prey on low-income people
or to exclude them from opportunities due to biases entrenched in
algorithmic decision-making tools. New kinds of “networked privacy”
harms, in which users are simultaneously held liable for their own
behavior and the actions of those in their networks, may have particularly
negative impacts on the poor. This Article reports on original empirical
findings from a large, nationally-representative telephone survey with an
oversample of low-income American adults, and highlights how these
patterns make particular groups of low-status Internet users uniquely
vulnerable to various forms of surveillance and networked privacy-related
problems. In particular, a greater reliance on mobile connectivity,
combined with lower usage of privacy-enhancing strategies, may
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contribute to various privacy and security-related harms. The Article then
discusses three scenarios in which big data—including data gathered from
social media inputs—is being aggregated to make predictions about
individual behavior: employment screening, access to higher education,
and predictive policing. Analysis of the legal frameworks surrounding
these case studies reveals a lack of legal protections to counter digital
discrimination against low-income people. In light of these legal gaps, the
Article assesses leading proposals for enhancing digital privacy through
the lens of class vulnerability, including comprehensive consumer privacy
legislation, digital literacy, notice and choice regimes, and due process
approaches. As policymakers consider reforms, the Article urges greater
attention to impacts on low-income persons and communities.
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INTRODUCTION
Low-income communities have historically been subject to a wide
range of governmental monitoring and related privacy intrusions in daily
life.1 The privacy harms that poor communities and their residents suffer
as a result of pervasive surveillance are especially acute in light of the
resulting economic and social consequences and the low likelihood that
they will be able to bear the costs associated with remedying those harms.2
In the “big data” era, there are growing concerns that low-status Internet
users who have lower levels of income or education may be further
differentially impacted by certain forms of Internet-enabled data
collection, surveillance, and marketing.3 Low-status users may be both
unfairly excluded from opportunities (such as access to credit) and unfairly
targeted (for example, by predatory marketing strategies) based on
determinations made by predictive analytics and scoring systems—
growing numbers of which rely on some form of social media input.4
These new kinds of “networked privacy” harms, in which users are
simultaneously held liable for their own behavior and the actions of those
in their networks, could have particularly negative impacts on the poor.5
In addition to the harms created by targeting or exclusion from

1. See Michele Estrin Gilman, The Class Differential in Privacy Law, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1389
(2012) [hereinafter Gilman, Class Differential]; see also Virginia Eubanks, Want to Predict the Future
of Surveillance? Ask Poor Communities., AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 15, 2014), https://perma.cc/MQ3TNWPB.
2. In this Article, poverty is defined as “economic deprivation,” although we do not endorse
any particular method of measuring poverty. See JOHN ICELAND, POVERTY IN AMERICA: A
HANDBOOK 23 (3d ed. 2013) (defining poverty). The United States’ official poverty line is an absolute
measure (based on a needs standard that is constant over time), while relative measures are based on
comparative disadvantage, fluctuating over time. Id. at 23–24. On the various methods of measuring
poverty and their merits, see generally id. ch. 3.
3. See NATHAN NEWMAN, HOW BIG DATA ENABLES ECONOMIC HARM TO CONSUMERS,
ESPECIALLY TO LOW-INCOME AND OTHER VULNERABLE SECTORS OF THE POPULATION (2014),
https://perma.cc/VB4Y-53SR (public comments filed in response to a Federal Trade Commission
request for workshop submissions).
4. See Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L. REV. 671
(2016); see also Jonas Lerman, Big Data and Its Exclusions, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 55, 56 (2013),
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy-and-big-data/big-data-and-its-exclusions (“[B]illions
of people remain on its margins because they do not routinely engage in activities that big data and
advanced analytics are designed to capture.”).
5. See danah boyd, Karen Levy & Alice Marwick, The Networked Nature of Algorithmic
Discrimination, in DATA AND DISCRIMINATION: COLLECTED ESSAYS 53–57 (Seeta Peña
Gangadharan, Virginia Eubanks & Solon Barocas, eds., 2014), https://perma.cc/V59G-JWDE; see
generally Alice E. Marwick & danah boyd, Networked Privacy: How Teenagers Negotiate Context in
Social Media, 16 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 1051 (2014), http://nms.sagepub.com/content/16/7/1051.
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opportunity, the poor may face magnified privacy vulnerabilities as a
result of community-specific patterns around technology use and
knowledge gaps about privacy- and security-protective tools.6 Legal
scholars have identified a broad group of consumers as “privacy
vulnerable” when they “misunderstand the scope of data collection and
falsely believe that relevant privacy rights are enshrined in privacy policies
and guaranteed by law.”7 These misconceptions are common across all
socioeconomic categories, but this Article suggests that these conditions
may be exacerbated by poor communities’ higher reliance on mobile
connectivity and lower likelihood to take various privacy-protective
measures online. When low-income adults rely on devices and apps that
make them more vulnerable to surveillance, and they (wittingly or
unwittingly) do not restrict access to the content they post online, they
may be further exposed to forms of commercial data collection that can
affect the way they are assessed in employment, education, and law
enforcement contexts.8
Thus, we suggest that poor people are burdened many times over by
data collection and privacy intrusion. Not only are the poor subject to
more surveillance than other subpopulations,9 and at higher stakes, but in
addition, poor Americans’ patterns of privacy-relevant behaviors and
device use open them up to greater vulnerability. We demonstrate these
behavioral patterns using original empirical data from a nationally
representative survey and suggest that differences like these must be
considered in privacy-protective policymaking and design decisions.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides a historical overview
of the ways in which the poor have been subject to uniquely far-reaching
surveillance across many aspects of life, and how their experiences of
harm may be impacted by evolving practices in big-data-driven decision

6. See SEETA PEÑA GANGADHARAN, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION, JOINING THE
SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY? NEW INTERNET USERS IN AN AGE OF TRACKING (2013), https://www.
newamerica.org/oti/joining-the-surveillance-society/; Jennifer M. Urban & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, The
Privacy Pragmatic as Privacy Vulnerable, BERKELEY PUBLIC LAW RESEARCH PAPER No. 2514381
(2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2514381 (presented to the Symposium on Usable Privacy and
Security Workshop on Privacy Personas and Segmentation (PPS)).
7. Urban & Hoofnagle, supra note 6, at 3.
8. Part III of this Article discusses various case studies that highlight the scenarios in which
these assessments may occur.
9.
See generally Torin Monahan, Regulating Belonging: Surveillance, Inequality, and the
Cultural Production of Abjection, 10 J. CULTURAL ECON. 191 (2017). “[S]urveillance manifests as a
multiplicity of techniques that conjure, coalesce around, and mediate the experiences of abject
subjects. Abjection signifies not only extreme need or destitution, but also a kind of social exclusion . .
. .” Id. at 192.
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making. In using the term “poor” to signify a condition of economic
deprivation, this Article recognizes that low-income people in America are
a diverse and multifaceted group and that each person has his or her own
individualized narrative.10 Despite this diversity, this Article highlights a
shared reality for many poor people, which is heightened vulnerability to
online surveillance and associated adverse outcomes.
Part II presents new empirical findings from a nationally representative
survey to highlight various technology-related behaviors and concerns that
suggest low-status Internet users may be especially vulnerable to
surveillance and networked privacy-related harms. By providing empirical
data that demonstrates the increased vulnerability of low-income Internet
users to privacy violations, we identify specific patterns of access and
behavior that may help inform policy and technology design decisions.11
In Part III, we show why and how this matters through a legal
examination of several timely case studies that demonstrate how online
activity, and the emerging use of social media data in particular, might
have detrimental impacts on the poor when used in high-stakes decisionmaking systems. This Part explains why current legal frameworks fail to
shield the poor from negative outcomes.
Finally, in Part IV, we assess major proposals for protecting personal
data through the lens of class vulnerability. In other words, we evaluate
how these proposals might impact poor people. We agree with other
scholars that additional technical and non-technical reforms are needed to
address the risks associated with the use of social media data. As
policymakers consider reforms, we urge greater attention to how reforms
may differentially impact low-income communities.

10. See JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE, AND THE
LIMITS OF PRIVACY 20–21 (2001) (describing demographic, political, physical, and regional variations
among poor people); see also Frank Munger, Introduction to LABORING BELOW THE LINE: THE NEW
ETHNOGRAPHY OF POVERTY, LOW-WAGE WORK, AND SURVIVAL IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, 20
(Frank Munger ed., 2002) (asserting the importance of seeing and understanding the poor as
individuals with their own narratives).
11. For more on the use of empirical data in legal scholarship, see Theodore Eisenberg, Why Do
Empirical Legal Scholarship? 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV 1741 (2004); Daniel Ho & Larry Kramer,
Introduction: The Empirical Revolution in Law, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1195 (2013).
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I. THE INTERSECTION OF PRIVACY AND POVERTY
A. Brief History of Privacy-Related Vulnerabilities and Surveillance of the
Poor
Historically, the poor have had far less control over the privacy of their
homes, bodies, and decisions than their more affluent counterparts.12 In
Colonial America, most towns had an “overseer of the poor” who tracked
poor people and either chased them out of town or auctioned them off for
free labor.13 By the 1800s, when poorhouses became the dominant poor
relief policy, the poor were warehoused in dismal quarters where they
labored under the watchful eye of the “keeper.”14 Even as anti-poverty
policy became more benevolent in the late 1800s, the scientific charity
movement relied on “friendly visitors” to investigate the homes of the
poor and exhort them to higher morals.15 For over three centuries,
surveillance in various forms has served the political purposes of
“containment of alleged social contagion, evaluation of moral suitability
for inclusion in public life and its benefits, and suppression of working
people’s resistance and collective power.”16
The New Deal created the modern welfare state and continued this
history of surveillance of the “undeserving poor” (that is, able-bodied
adults who were considered capable of work).17 In administering welfare,
states devised a variety of discretionary surveillance tactics—such as
midnight raids on welfare recipients’ homes and moral fitness tests—
designed to reduce the welfare rolls and push poor women, mostly of
color, into the low-wage labor force.18 Today, states subject single mothers

12. See GILLIOM, supra note 10, at 23.
13. See WALTER TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF SOCIAL
WELFARE IN AMERICA 9–10 (6th ed. 1999).
14. See id. at 57–61; MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL
HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA 27–28 (10th ed. 1996).
15. See KATZ, supra note 14, at 70; TRATTNER, supra note 13, at 91–92.
16. Virginia Eubanks, Technologies of Citizenship: Surveillance and Political Learning in the
Welfare System, in SURVEILLANCE AND SECURITY: TECHNOLOGICAL POLITICS AND POWER IN
EVERYDAY LIFE (Torin Monahan ed., 2006) [hereinafter Eubanks, Technologies of Citizenship].
17. On the New Deal division between deserving and undeserving poor, see Michele Estrin
Gilman, The Return of the Welfare Queen, 22 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 247, 257–58 (2014)
and sources cited therein.
18. See KAARYN S. GUSTAFSON, CHEATING WELFARE: PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY 21 (2011) ("The unstated but underlying goals of the rules were to
police and punish the sexuality of single mothers, to close off the indirect access to government
support of able-bodied men, to winnow the welfare rolls, and to reinforce the idea that families
receiving aid were entitled to no more than near-desperate living standards.").
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who draw public assistance to drug tests, DNA testing of children,
fingerprinting, extreme verification requirements, and intrusive
questioning about intimate relationships.19 Some scholars and judges have
argued that higher-income Americans would object if the government
treated them similarly in exchange for the valuable governmental benefits
they receive, such as mortgage deductions, school loans, and child care tax
credits.20 As Justice Douglas stated in his dissent to the Supreme Court’s
upholding of welfare home visits, “[n]o such sums are spent policing the
government subsidies granted to farmers, airlines, steamship companies,
and junk mail dealers, to name but a few.”21
The structure of the current welfare system aims to put poor women to
work.22 Yet the low-wage workplace, where one-third of workers toil,23 is
no escape from surveillance. Employers today log computer key strokes,
listen to telephone calls, review emails and Internet usage, conduct drug
tests, employ mystery shoppers, watch closed-circuit television, and
require psychometric and “honesty” tests as conditions of employment.24
Employers increasingly track employee movements through GPS or radio
frequency devices, which “create new streams of data about where
employees are during the workday, what they are doing, how long their

19. See Kaaryn Gustafson, Degradation Ceremonies and the Criminalization of Low-Income
Women, U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 297, 312–321 (2013) [hereinafter Gusafson, Degradation Ceremonies];
Khiara M. Bridges, Privacy Rights and Public Families, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 113, 114–16 (2011)
(discussing Medicaid program); Gilman, Class Differential, supra note 1, at 1397–1400 (discussing
welfare).
20. See Jordan C. Budd, A Fourth Amendment for the Poor Alone: Subconstitutional Status and
the Myth of the Inviolate Home, 85 IND. L.J. 355, 404–05 (2010); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN,
THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 191
(1995) (“[M]iddle-class families benefit from extensive entitlement programs, be they FHA or VA
loans at below mortgage market rates or employer subsidized health and life insurance. These families
receive untaxed benefits as direct subsidies.”).
21. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 332 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting J. Skelly
Wright, Poverty, Minorities, and Respect for Law, 1970 DUKE L.J. 425, 427–38 (1970)).
22. The current welfare program is called Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) and
was created by the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104–193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections at 43 U.S.C. § 605(a)
(2000)). The work requirements are at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2012).
23. See Gilman, supra note 1, at 1400.
24. The Converus company offers a retina-based lie detector technology called EyeDetect, to
screen potential employees. Job Applicant and Employment Screening, CONVERUS, http://converus.
com/pre-employment-ongoing-screening/. See generally Kirstie Ball, Workplace Surveillance: An
Overview, 51 LAB. HIST. 87 (2010); Alex Rosenblat, Tamara Kneese & danah boyd, Workplace
Surveillance, DATA & SOC’Y RESEARCH INST. (2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2536605; Ifeoma Ajunwa, Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz,
Limitless Worker Surveillance, 105 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
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tasks take, and whether they comply with employment rules.”25 These
sorts of tools seem to have found broad use in low-wage workplaces in
particular,26 and may be purposefully overt (rather than invisible) in order
to let workers know they are being watched and to control their behavior.
Other forms of surveillance are more covert; the objects of surveillance are
not conscious that they are being observed. These behavioral control
mechanisms can take many forms—at their most extreme, they include the
use of facial recognition technology to ensure employees are smiling
enough and audio recording to monitor employees’ tone of voice.27 Thus,
from welfare to work and beyond, low-income people have been subject to
covert and overt surveillance as tools of control.
B. The Evolving Nature of Privacy Harms Experienced by the Poor
While many Americans express unease over a perceived loss of
privacy,28 the harms to the poor from surveillance regimes reach far
beyond generalized anxiety.29 This is because many surveillance systems
that surround the poor are purposefully designed to deliver a message of
stigma to the subject while reinforcing societal stereotypes about
dependency.30 In turn, these stereotypes drive punitive laws directed at the
poor.31 Even if they are not always visible, privacy harms to the poor are
real and can have physical and psychological impacts. For instance,

25. Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing
Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 112–13 (2010).
26. See id. (describing sensors on company trucks and cars and Bank of America monitoring of
call-center employees); Karen E. C. Levy, The Contexts of Control: Information, Power, and TruckDriving Work, 31 THE INFO. SOC’Y 160 (2015); Gilman, Class Differential, supra note 1, at 1400–03.
27. Sally Davies, From a Frown to a Smile, the Technology That’s in Your Face, FIN. TIMES
(Jan. 2, 2014), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ccaac9e6-6f06-11e3-9ac9-00144feabdc0.html; Rachel
Emma Silverman, Tracking Sensors Invade the Workplace—Monitors on Workers, Furniture Offer
Clues for Boosting Productivity; Switching to Bigger Lunch Tables, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 7, 2013, 11:42
AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324034804578344303429080678; Suzanne
McGee, How Employers Tracking Your Health Can Cross the Line and Become Big Brother,
GUARDIAN (May 1, 2015, 8:30 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/us-money-blog/2015/
may/01/employers-tracking-health-fitbit-apple-watch-big-brother.
28. On public opinion regarding privacy and its trade-offs, see Lee Rainie & Shiva Maniam,
Americans Feel the Tensions Between Privacy and Security Concerns, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 19, 2016),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/02/19/americans-feel-the-tensions-between-privacy-andsecurity-concerns/.
29. See Gilman, supra note 1, at 1394.
30. See Gustafson, Degradation Ceremonies, supra note 19 at 343–44, 354; Harry Murray,
Deniable Degradation: The Finger-Imaging of Welfare Recipients, 15 SOC. F. 39, 40–42 (2000).
31. See Gustafson, Degradation Ceremonies, supra note 19, at 348; LOЇC WACQUANT,
PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL INSECURITY 1–3 (2009).
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surveillance can discourage the poor from accessing needed help or
engaging with social and financial institutions due to fears associated with
monitoring.32 Moreover, welfare recipients suffer psychological injuries
related to a loss of self-agency and reproach that can further trap them
below the poverty line.33 Similarly, in the low-wage workplace, invasive
surveillance can result in disproportionate levels of psychological
problems, including depression, which in turn may lower employee
productivity and employer profits.34
The class differential in privacy harms also extends to life online. In
the early days of the Internet, the poor faced a stark digital divide—they
were excluded from online life due to an inability to afford computers and
broadband access.35 These days, low-income Americans are increasingly
online, often through the use of smartphones.36 Mobile access has helped
to narrow the digital divide, but has left low-income Americans vulnerable
to new forms of tracking. Poor Americans are considerably less likely to
use Apple phones, which provide more robust encryption and are
generally less susceptible to being hacked compared to their less
expensive Android counterparts37 Wealthy and higher-educated Americans

32. See Sarah Brayne, Surveillance and System Avoidance: Criminal Justice Contact and
Institutional Attachment, AM. SOC. REV. (2014); ROBERT MOFFITT ET AL., DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., A STUDY OF TANF NON-ENTRANTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE OFFICE OF THE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION 2, 14 (2003) (reporting that new welfare
report policies discourage participation).
33. See Nancy Goodban, The Psychological Impact of Being on Welfare, 59 SOC. SERV. REV.
403 (1985); GILLIOM, supra note 10, at 66–67, 78 (summarizing interviews with welfare recipients in
Appalachia in the early 1990s); Nora Jacobson, A Taxonomy of Dignity:A Grounded Theory Study, 9
BMC INT’L HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 3, 7 (2009) (when the state treats marginalized people with a lack
of dignity, the results can include “loss of respect, loss of self-worth, ego, sense of self, and soul, loss
of status, social standing, and moral standing, loss of confidence and determination”).
34. See David Holman, Claire Chissick & Peter Totterdell, The Effects of Performance
Monitoring on Emotional Labor and Well-Being in Call Centers, 26 MOTIVATION & EMOTION 57, 74–
79 (2002); Debora Jeske & Alecia M. Santuzzi, Monitoring What and How: Psychological
Implications of Electronic Performance Monitoring, 30 NEW TECH., WORK & EMP. 62 (2015); M.J.
Smith et al., Employee Stress and Health Complaints in Jobs with and Without Electronic
Performance Monitoring, 23 APPLIED ERGONOMICS 17, 23–27 (1992); Scott C. D’Urso, Who’s
Watching Us at Work? Toward a Structural-Perceptual Model of Electronic Monitoring and
Surveillance in Organizations, 16 COMM. THEORY 281, 287 (2006).
35. See generally Janet Thompson Jackson, Capitalizing on Digital Entrepreneurship for LowIncome Residents and Communities, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 187 (2009).
36. See Aaron Smith, U.S. Smartphone Use in 2015, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 1, 2015),
http://www.pewInternet.org/2015/04/01/us-smartphone-use-in-2015/.
37. See Aaron Smith, Smartphone Ownership–2013 Update, PEW RES. CTR. (June 5, 2013),
https://perma.cc/KE53-9R5X; ACLU Complaint, Request for Investigation and Complaint for
Injunctive Relief, Apr. 16, 2013, available at https://perma.cc/W9AT-YUFD.
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are more likely to use iPhones, on which data is encrypted by default and
is more difficult for police, government, or phone companies to intercept.38
Beyond access, researchers have brought attention to the digital literacy
skills divide, which can also impact low-income Internet users’ exposure
to privacy- and security-related harms.39 In addition, certain inequalities
relate not to low-income Americans being more likely to experience a
given harm, but to their propensity to face harsher consequences as a result
of those harms, in part due to a lack of resources to seek redress. Consider
identity theft, a growing concern shared across social classes. This crime is
particularly devastating for low-income individuals, who face not only
financial losses that impact their ability to meet basic needs such as
housing and utility services, but are also left coping with more severe
consequences of someone else using their identity, such as wrongful
arrests, improper child support garnishments, and harassment by collection
agencies.40
It is also important to recognize that for the poor, overt and covert
surveillance systems interact with one another. For instance, after the
welfare system collects an applicant’s data, this data is electronically
shared and compared across multiple government and commercial
databases in order to determine eligibility and ferret out fraud. These
systems have the potential to make the application process easier and more
streamlined for both social service offices and applicants.41 At the same
time, these databases are plagued with outdated, inaccurate, and
incomplete data.42 As a result, thousands of people have been denied
benefits to which they would otherwise be entitled. 43
On a day-to-day basis, welfare benefits and food stamps are distributed
electronically and monitored to see how recipients are spending their

38. See Christopher Soghoian, Your Smartphone is a Civil Rights Issue, TED TALK (Oct. 2016),
https://perma.cc/29ZQ-MFFB; Kaveh Waddell, Encryption is a Luxury, ATLANTIC (Mar. 28, 2016),
https://perma.cc/DY7K-PTWY.
39. See Eszter Hargittai, Second-Level Digital Divide: Differences in People’s Online Skills, 7
FIRST MONDAY (2002), https://perma.cc/A3FA-W9D2; Paul DiMaggio et al., From Unequal Access to
Differentiated Use: A Literature Review and Agenda for Research on Digital Inequality, in SOCIAL
INEQUALITY 355 (Kathryn Neckerman, ed., 2004).
40. See Sarah Dranoff, Identity Theft: A Low-Income Issue, 17 AM. BAR ASSOC. DIALOGUE
MAG., Winter 2014, https://perma.cc/ES6W-QFZ8.
41. See STAN DORN & ELIZABETH LOWER-BASCH, CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY, MOVING TO
21ST-CENTURY PUBLIC BENEFITS: EMERGING OPTIONS, GREAT PROMISE, AND KEY CHALLENGES 4–6
(2012), https://perma.cc/SHM2-KX8L.
42. See id. at 15–19; Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV.
1249, 1256–58 (2008).
43. Id. at 1256–57, 1268–73.
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money, thereby limiting “clients’ autonomy, opportunity, and mobility:
their ability to meet their needs in their own way.”44 Moreover, public
benefits data is fed to law enforcement systems and vice-versa, in an
ongoing loop of digital records sharing.45 In addition, the personal data
held in public benefits systems is at risk of security breaches. For instance,
the Lifeline program, which provides wireless phones to low-income
people, requires applicants to share personally identifiable information
including income, social security numbers, and drivers’ license numbers.46
The communications industry has fought proposed government
requirements that they keep this data secure.47
In sum, surveillance of the poor is broader, more invasive, and more
difficult to redress than surveillance of other groups, and the overlap
among government, commercial, and institutional data flows creates
unique challenges for maintaining the accuracy and security of records.
Low-income Americans live in communities with overt and omnipresent
surveillance, and this oppression extends into the more covert surveillance
that happens online. In both systems, the harms suffered by the poor can
be concrete and stigmatizing.
C. Big Data Analytics, Social Media, and the Potential for Negative
Impacts Among Low-Income Communities
Poor Americans face heightened risks from big data (that is, the
collection, aggregation, analysis, and use of mass amounts of digital
information gathered and shared about individuals).48 Big data “gathers its
contents from a myriad of online user interactions and infrastructure
sensors, ranging from online transactions, search queries, and health
records to communication networks, electric grids, and mobile phones.”49
Big data systems scoop up personal information when people shop in
stores or online, visit websites, pay bills, use social media and mobile
applications, or use devices such as fitness trackers.50 Certain systems then

44. See Eubanks, Technologies of Citizenship, supra note 16, at 90–91.
45. See Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643,
647, 667–71 (2009).
46. See Margaret Harding McGill, CTIA Defends Its Challenge of FCC Lifeline Privacy
Changes, LAW 360 (Oct. 20, 2015, 6:02 PM), https://perma.cc/7KJ4-K28Y.
47. See id.
48. See Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to
Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 96 (2014).
49. Id. at 96.
50. FED. TRADE COMM’N, BIG DATA: A TOOL FOR INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION?
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combine that information with more “traditional” metrics that are used to
evaluate individuals—such as credit history, criminal background records,
and educational testing scores.51 Big data holds tremendous promise to
improve problem solving through greater insight into complex issues. It
also raises the peril of information mischaracterization, misinterpretation,
and abuse—all without the knowledge of the subjects whose data is being
manipulated.52
The obfuscation of big data methods that now occurs across many
industries has been variably described by scholars as creating a “black box
society,”53 a “transparency paradox,”54 and a lack of “algorithmic
accountability.”55 Limited public awareness about these practices has
contributed to a regulatory environment in which the aggregation and
brokering of personal data has largely gone unchecked.56 This has renewed
concerns about the impact of these information asymmetries on lowincome populations, and the extent to which these dynamics may be
contributing to increases in economic inequality in the United States.57
On the surface, big data collection may appear to be less stigmatizing
for the poor than many of their other interpersonal interactions with the
government because it is invisible. Algorithmic assessments that passively
take one’s online activities into account do not make the same kind of
dehumanizing requests of low-income people (such as asking for urine
samples or sexual history) as is sometimes required during the process of

UNDERSTANDING THE ISSUES 1 (2016), https://perma.cc/5LAG-83MZ.
51. See generally infra case studies discussed in Part III.
52. See generally danah boyd & Kate Crawford, Critical Questions for Big Data: Provocations
for a Cultural, Technological, and Scholarly Phenomenon, 15 INFO., COMM. & SOC’Y 662, 663
(2012), https://perma.cc/5BLE-KFBC (“Like other socio-technical phenomena, Big Data triggers both
utopian and dystopian rhetoric.”).
53. FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL
MONEY AND INFORMATION 3 (2015).
54. Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Three Paradoxes of Big Data, 66 STAN. L. REV. 41,
42 (2013).
55. ALEX ROSENBLAT, TAMARA KNEESE & DANAH BOYD, ALGORITHMIC ACCOUNTABILITY,
DATA & SOC’Y RES. INST. (2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2535540.
56. See Alice E. Marwick, How Your Data Are Being Deeply Mined, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Jan. 9,
2014, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/01/09/how-your-data-are-being-deeply-mined/.
57. See Newman, supra note 3, at 2–3; FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR
TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 46–48 (2014), https://perma.cc/CAZ5-54PC; EXEC. OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING VALUES 6–7 (2014),
https://perma.cc/C6SB-BLC6 [hereinafter SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES]; Joseph W. Jerome, Buying and
Selling Privacy: Big Data’s Different Burdens and Benefits, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 47, 51 (2013)
(“Most of the biggest concerns we have about big data—discrimination, profiling, tracking,
exclusion—threaten the self-determination and personal autonomy of the poor more any other class.”).
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seeking public benefits.58 Yet, the use of big data can injure the economic
stability and civil rights of the poor, such as when they are targeted for
predatory financial products, charged more for goods and services online,
or profiled in ways that limit their employment and educational
opportunities.59 Conversely, big data can also result in the exclusion of
marginalized groups from desirable opportunities “because they are less
involved in the formal economy and its data-generating activities [or
because they] have unequal access to and relatively less fluency in the
technology necessary to engage online, or are less profitable customers or
important constituents and therefore less interesting as targets of
observation.”60
Many poor people, and particularly low-income people of color, live in
crowded urban environments that are under constant surveillance by law
enforcement.61 As a result, they are much more likely than people in other
contexts to become entangled with the criminal justice and child welfare
systems, both of which are highly stigmatizing and privacy-stripping.62
These interactions then become embedded in big data inputs and
assessments, which in turn limits housing, employment, and educational
opportunities for those affected.63 At the same time, big data analysis of
poor peoples’ information is aggregated and used to craft policies and
rules that then shape poor peoples’ lives. As one commentator noted with
regard to the collection of data from homeless people as a condition of
receiving services, “whether or not a specific individual can be related
back to data generated out of that individual, the life of that data will
absorb and transform the life of that individual.”64
The practice of specifically incorporating social media data into big
data systems is becoming increasingly common in a wide range of

58. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
59. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 50, at 9–11 (summarizing concerns raised by
stakeholders).
60. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 685.
61. See Kathryne M. Young & Joan Petersilia, Keeping Track: Surveillance, Control, and the
Expansion of the Carceral State, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1322 (2016); MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE
NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 124–26 (2013); LORI BETH
WAY & RYAN PATTEN, HUNTING FOR “DIRTBAGS”: WHY COPS OVER-POLICE THE POOR AND RACIAL
MINORITIES 3, 5, 103, 116, 136 (2013).
62. On criminal justice, see id. On child welfare, see generally DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED
BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 8 (2002).
63. See infra Part III. On the loss of opportunities wrought by possessing a criminal record, see
generally JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD, 225–314 (2015).
64. Craig Willse, “Universal Data Elements,” or the Biopolitical Life of Homeless Populations,
5 SURVEILLANCE & SOC. 227, 245 (2008).
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industries. While thousands of data points—including both structured and
unstructured data—may feed into various assessment tools, unique
features of social media data can make it especially problematic for
ensuring fairness and preventing bias in various forms of decisionmaking.65 As boyd et al. argue, the value in analyzing social media data
stems, in part, from the ability to assess both to whom you are connected
and “who[m] you are like” based on your behavior and preferences. This
information becomes valuable to a range of entities, from marketers to
employers to law enforcement.66
Poor Americans have long suffered from guilt by association, meaning
they bear the stereotypes and stigma of their social class (and race and
gender) in ways that impede their economic progress and well-being.67 As
scholars who study the surveillance of marginalized groups have noted,
“networks of association are not random, and who we know online is
affected by offline forms of residential, educational, and occupational
segregation.”68 The case studies in this Article highlight concrete examples
of how these guilt-by-association effects, when paired with the networked
nature of social media data, may exacerbate big data-related harms for the
poor.
Simply opting out from using social media and other digital
technologies to avoid these risks is not an option in today’s digital world,
and may be impossible for some forms of surveillance.69 Increasingly,
institutions—such as schools, workplaces, and social service agencies—
require engagement on certain platforms to get access to information and
resources. Internet access has become an essential conduit for commerce,
educational information, job opportunities, government services, and to
maintain social connections to friends and family. Low-income adults
recognize these benefits, with more than eight in ten saying the Internet
has improved their ability to “learn new things” and majorities reporting
that the Internet has made them better informed about products and
services.70 If low-income users were to opt out of using certain websites or

65. See boyd et al., supra note 5, at 43–57.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, BLAME WELFARE, IGNORE POVERTY
AND INEQUALITY 70 (2007); Heather E. Bullock, Justifying Inequality: A Social Psychological
Analysis of Beliefs About Poverty and the Poor, in THE COLORS OF POVERTY: WHY RACIAL AND
ETHNIC DISPARITIES PERSIST 52, 57 (Ann Chih Lin & David R. Harris eds., 2008).
68. Eubanks, supra note 1.
69. Sarah Kessler, Think You Can Live Offline Without Being Tracked? Here’s What It Takes,
FAST COMPANY (Oct. 15, 2013, 6:00 AM), https://perma.cc/Q5UQ-42UY.
70. Kristen Purcell & Lee Rainie, Americans Feel Better Informed Thanks to the Internet, PEW
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applications due to privacy concerns, they would also lose the ability to
access the myriad opportunities associated with engagement in online life.
II. SURVEY OF PRIVACY AND SECURITY CONCERNS OF LOW-INCOME
INDIVIDUALS
Low-income individuals, then, face pervasive and disproportionate
scrutiny in connection with government services, institutional
involvement, and low-wage work, and face new and evolving challenges
due to the advent of big data analytics and “guilt by association.” But in
addition to these, poor Americans’ patterns of technology use and privacyrelevant behaviors expose them to greater risk than their wealthier
counterparts. In Part II, we demonstrate these disparities empirically.
A. Challenges in Demonstrating Harm and Need for Empirical Research
Highlighting Unique Vulnerabilities of Low-Income Groups
Prior empirical studies have found that low-income Internet users are
significantly more likely than higher-income users to report negative
experiences connected to their online activity.71 For instance, poorer
Internet users are more likely to say they had an email or social media
account compromised, and are more likely to report having their
reputation damaged by online activity.72 However, the reporting of
privacy-related harms in surveys relies on respondents being aware of the
negative impacts in question. In cases of big-data-related decision-making
and discrimination, it is nearly impossible for respondents to know what
personal or behavioral information may have factored into an unfavorable
outcome.
Recent qualitative studies have focused on understanding what
behaviors might be associated with privacy-related vulnerabilities among
low-status users. For instance, researchers have suggested that “marginal
Internet users” who rely on digital literacy organizations for training and
access, may be more likely to engage in online behaviors that make them
susceptible to potential privacy problems, such as being tracked with thirdparty cookies or unwittingly disclosing their information to fraudulent or

RES. CTR. 2 (DEC. 8, 2014), https://perma.cc/R3DC-JGE4.
71. Lee Rainie et al., Anonymity, Privacy, and Security Online, PEW RES. CTR. 24 (Sept. 15,
2013), https://perma.cc/JT98-FCZ5.
72. Id.
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predatory websites.73 In addition, legal scholars have noted the need for
analysis that examines whether or not low-status users face magnified
privacy vulnerabilities due to knowledge gaps about privacy and securityrelated tools.74
We build upon this framework of understanding privacy-related
vulnerabilities and provide new insights into the behaviors and attitudes of
low-income Internet and social media users, which are of particular
relevance to discussions of big-data-driven analysis. In the section that
follows, we address the intersection of privacy-related vulnerabilities and
socioeconomic status through an empirical examination of tech-related
behaviors among low-income groups, using data from a new, nationally
representative survey. And while income is the primary focus of our
analysis, it is not the only indicator of a person’s socioeconomic status
(SES). For instance, the American Psychological Association broadly
defines socioeconomic status as “the social standing or class of an
individual or group,” which is “often measured as a combination of
education, income and occupation.”75
B. Survey Methods and Goals
In order to help address the question of how privacy and security
experiences vary across different socioeconomic groups, the Digital Trust
Foundation supported the fielding of a robust, nationally representative
twenty-minute random-digit-dial telephone survey of 3000 American
adults eighteen and older. The sample included an oversample of adults
with annual household incomes of less than $40,000.76 This survey,
fielded in November and December of 2015, explores how low-income
adults’ concerns about privacy fit into the larger scope of concerns they
have in everyday life, and contributes to a deeper understanding of their

73. Gangadharan, supra at 6.
74. Urban & Hoofnagle, supra note 10, at 4.
75. See AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N REPORT OF THE APA TASK FORCE ON SOCIOECONOMIC
STATUS (2007), http://www.apa.org/pi/ses/resources/publications/task-force-2006.pdf (also noting that
various indicators are often overlapping; those who live with lower household incomes also tend to
have lower education levels and work in low-wage jobs).
76. This level of annual income represents roughly 200% of the current federal poverty level for
a household of three. See 2015 Poverty Guideline, ASPE (2015), https://perma.cc/7VBF-UGKR.
Current estimates from the Census Bureau suggest the average household size in the U.S. is 2.54
people. See Families and Living Arrangements, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://perma.cc/53JT-3XYC.
The survey included a standard measure of an individual’s household income that asks each participant
to report their “total family income from all sources, before taxes” for the previous year. Id.
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technology-related behaviors and beliefs.77
Among the key findings in this new survey are several that suggest
greater privacy-related vulnerabilities among low-income Internet users as
compared to higher income groups. While some of these differences may
be influenced by multiple contributing factors (such as one’s age and
education level), examining variations through the lens of income helps to
inform policy and technology design decisions that are specifically
tailored for low-income groups. In particular, the discussion that follows
highlights certain sociotechnical behaviors that, when combined with a
lack of sufficient legal protections and rapidly evolving industry practices,
may result in increased exposure to surveillance and big-data related
harms among low-status groups.78
C. Patterns of Mobile Internet Use Unique to Low-Income Populations
Echoing previous findings from a wide range of empirical studies, the
survey results indicate that low-income Internet users who own
smartphones are significantly more likely than higher income groups to
say they “mostly go online” using their cell phone.79 Even when
considering the fact that low-income adults are less likely to be Internet
users and less likely to own smartphones overall, the share of low-income
adults who rely on their mobile devices as their primary source of Internet
connectivity still exceeds that of higher income groups.
Overall, 39% of all Internet users who own a smartphone say that their
cell phone is the primary way they go online. Another 41% say they
mostly use some other device, and 20% report that they use their cell
phone and other devices equally. However, the differences at either end of
the income spectrum are stark; 63% of smartphone Internet users who live
in households earning less than $20,000 per year say they mostly go online
using their cell phone, compared with just 21% of those in households
earning $100,000 or more per year.

77. Co-author Mary Madden is also the Principal Investigator for this project. The main survey
report is scheduled for publication in 2017 and will include a detailed discussion of methods and
sample design. Mary Madden, Privacy, Security and Digital Inequality: How Technology Experiences
and Resources Vary Based on Socioeconomic Status and Race, DATA & SOC’Y RESEARCH INST.
(forthcoming 2017). See infra Appendix for a summary of methods used for the survey.
78. All differences noted between various comparison groups discussed throughout this section
are statistically significant. The differences were evaluated with an independent Z-test for significance
at the 95% confidence level.
79. Maeve Duggan & Aaron Smith, Cell Internet Use 2013, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 16, 2013),
https://perma.cc/49NH-37NN.
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The survey findings also suggest that age is an important indicator;
looking at broader income groups (less than $40,000 per year vs. $40,000
per year or more), Internet users ages eighteen to twenty-nine who have a
smartphone and are in the lower income bracket are more likely to report a
reliance on cell phones for Internet access when compared with young
adults living in higher income households (62% vs. 46%).80 However,
there is an even larger gap among lower income smartphone owners ages
thirty to forty-nine, who are more than twice as likely as higher income
adults of the same age to say they mostly go online using their phone
(71% vs. 29%).

80. These broader income categories (<$40K/$40K+) are used when analyzing detailed age
groups in order to allow for a large enough sample to make valid comparisons.

72

[VOL. 95:053

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Table 1. Mostly Mobile Internet Use by Income
Responses to the question: “Overall, when you use the Internet, do
you do that mostly using your cell phone or mostly using some
other device like a desktop, laptop or tablet computer?”
Internet
users who
own a
smartphone

Less than $20K- $40K- $75K$20K
unde
under under
r
$75K
$100
$40K
K

$100K

(a)

(b)

(c)

(e)

(f)

Mostly on cell
phone

39%

63%def

58%def 34%f

24%

21%

Mostly on
something else

41%

22%

28%

42%bc

61%bcd

52%bc

Both equally
(Volunteered)

20%

14%

13%

24%bc

15%

26%bce

(d)

or more

Note: Significant differences within rows are noted with superscript
letters indicating the column to which the item should be
compared. For instance, the 63% of those in households earning
less than $20,000 per year who say they use the Internet mostly
from their cell phone is significantly higher than those in
households earning $40,000 or more. The differences noted here
were evaluated with an independent Z-test for significance at the
95% confidence level. Column (a), which displays responses for
all Internet users who own a smartphone, is not included in the
significance testing. A small number of users (1% or less) offered
a volunteered response of “It depends” or “Don’t know” in
response to this question; those responses are omitted.
Source: Privacy and Security Experience of Low-Socioeconomic
Status Populations Survey, November 18–December 23, 2015,
including an oversample of adults living in households earning
less than $40,000 per year. Interviews were conducted in English
and Spanish (Total n=3,000 US adults age 18 and older, n=1,724
for Internet users who own a smartphone).
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D. Privacy and Security Vulnerabilities Associated with Reliance on
Mobile Devices
Recent media coverage about the strong encryption available on Apple
iPhones has largely overshadowed the many well-documented privacy
vulnerabilities associated with mobile devices and applications.81 While
current versions of the Apple iOS operating system may make it difficult
for law enforcement to access the contents of a locked phone, cell phone
users are still subject to a wide range of mobile surveillance possibilities
that they may be unaware of, including advertisers’ cross-device
tracking,82 cell site simulators83 and in-store tracking by retailers.84 In
particular, location-related data, when gathered from mobile devices over
a period of time and tied to both online and offline behaviors, can reveal
an incredibly intimate portrait of users’ daily lives. A recent study
published in Nature magazine illustrated that human mobility traces are a
highly unique and sensitive form of data that pose considerable reidentification risks with only a handful of spatio-temporal data points. As
the authors note:
Mobility data is among the most sensitive data currently being
collected. Mobility data contains the approximate whereabouts of
individuals and can be used to reconstruct individuals' movements
across space and time . . . . While in the past, mobility traces were
only available to mobile phone carriers, the advent of smartphones
and other means of data collection has made these broadly
available.85
Beyond the broadcasting of location-related data, mobile applications
create various vulnerabilities for smartphone users who rely on their
phones as their primary mode of Internet access. Of particular relevance to

81. See Paarijaat Aditya, et al., Brave New World: Privacy Risks for Mobile Users, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACM MOBICOM WORKSHOP ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN MOBILE
ENVIRONMENTS 7 (2014), https://perma.cc/3FQL-TXMP.
82. Michael Whitener, Cookies Are So Yesterday; Cross-Device Tracking Is In—Some Tips,
PRIVACY ADVISOR (Jan. 27, 2015), https://perma.cc/5WAZ-824G.
83. See Kim Zetter, Turns Out Police Stingray Spy Tools Can Indeed Record Calls, WIRED
MAG. (Oct. 28, 2015, 3:00 PM), https://perma.cc/7GJ8-UEH4.
84. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Retail Tracking Firm Settles FTC Charges It Misled
Consumers About Opt Out Choices (Apr. 23, 2015), available at https://perma.cc/7H2P-9GSB.
85. Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye et al., Unique in the Crowd: The Privacy Bounds of Human
Mobility, 3 SCI. REPS. 1 (2013) (noting that Apple’s privacy policy allows the sharing of users’
location data with “partners and licensees” and estimating that geo-location data for roughly half of all
iOS and Android traffic is made available to advertising networks).
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debates about big data-related harms is the fact that mobile applications
have not always offered consistent access to privacy policies or privacy
controls for information sharing.86 While certain mobile operating
systems, such as iOS, offer simplified ways to manage location-sharing
preferences within certain apps and tools to limit ad tracking, granular
application settings to control other forms of in-app content sharing vary
widely. In some cases—particularly with older versions of social media
applications—a user must navigate to the website associated with a given
app in order to change default settings.87 Some applications automatically
opt-in users to higher levels of sharing than they may be aware of or
change the terms of service to retroactively apply to content that users had
previously posted to the platform.88
Many third-party mobile applications have been shown to access more
data than is necessary for the application to function.89 And some mobile
applications have been shown to embed software that can surreptitiously
perform other functions, such as monitoring a device’s microphone
without a user’s permission.90
There have also been notable security-related vulnerabilities associated
with the operating systems on mobile devices. In 2013, the ACLU filed a
complaint with the FTC noting that many smartphone owners were using a
version of the Android operating system that had “known, exploitable
security vulnerabilities for which fixes have been published by Google,
but have not been distributed to consumers’ smartphones by the wireless
carriers and their handset manufacturer partners.”91 These kinds of security

86. See, e.g., FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM, MOBILE APPS STUDY (2012) (finding that just over
half (53%) of the seventy-five paid apps reviewed for the study provided users access to a privacy
policy).
87. This was the case with older versions of the Facebook mobile app, which did not have the
inline audience selector. Changing the audience for the content shared on these older versions of the
app requires users to navigate on the website to specific settings for “old versions of Facebook for
mobile.” See How Do I Set the Audience When I’m Using an Older Version of Facebook for Mobile
That Doesn’t Have an Audience Selector?, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/2602766939
97558/?ref=u2u.
88. One recent example that surprised social media users was Snapchat’s retroactive changes
regarding their use of user images. See Sally French, Snapchat’s New ‘Scary’ Privacy Policy Has Left
Users Outraged, MARKETWATCH (Nov. 2, 2015, 4:13 PM). http://www.marketwatch.com/story/
snapchats-new-scary-privacy-policy-has-left-users-outraged-2015-10–29.
89. See, e.g., What They Know–Mobile, WALL ST. J. (APR. 3, 2017), https://perma.cc/LWK3P7DC; Apps Permissions in the Google Play Store, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 10, 2015), https://perma.cc
/TEU8-E28T.
90. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Issues Warning Letters to App Developers
Using ‘Silverpush’ Code (Mar. 17, 2016), available at https://perma.cc/N4YK-DH2Y.
91. See ACLU, supra note 37, at 1.
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vulnerabilities are likely to be especially acute for low-income groups,
who are more likely to be “smartphone dependent” for all or most of their
internet connectivity.92
E. Social Media Use, Privacy-Protective Behaviors, and Confidence in
Skills
Lower income Internet users are modestly more likely than Internet
users in higher income households to say they use social media such as
Facebook, Twitter or Instagram: 81% of online adults in households
earning less than $20,000 per year say they use social media, compared
with 73% of online adults in households earning $20,000 or more.93 Most
of this difference is attributable to the relative youthfulness of lower
income Internet users, as online adults under the age of fifty are equally
likely to use social media, regardless of income.
However, focusing more closely on privacy-related behaviors within
the population of social media users reveals several notable variations by
income.94 For instance, social media users in the lowest income bracket are
significantly less likely than higher earning groups to say they have used
privacy settings to restrict access to the content they post online—whether
on social media platforms or other websites. Among social media users
living in households earning less than $20,000 per year, 65% say they
have used privacy settings to limit who can see what they post online,
while 79% of those in wealthier households say they have done this.95
Some of these behaviors are also associated with lower levels of
confidence in certain privacy-related skills and knowledge. Low-income
social media users are less likely to feel as though they “know enough”
about managing the privacy settings for the information they share online
(65% vs. 77%) and are less likely to feel they have a good understanding
of the privacy policies for the applications and websites they use (64% vs.
74%). At the same time, low-income social media users are more likely
than higher earning groups to feel as though it would be “somewhat” or
“very” difficult to find tools and strategies that would help them protect

92. Smith, supra note 36.
93. This difference is modest, but statistically significant when comparing these broad groups.
94. Throughout this section, “low-income social media users” are defined as those living in
households earning less than $20,000 per year. Comparisons are made with social media users living
in households above that income threshold, and any differences included in the discussion are
statistically significant.
95. The question about privacy settings is not limited to social media and could include the use
of settings for other kinds of applications, platforms, and profiles.
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their personal information online (25% vs. 15%).
Low-income social media users are also less likely to engage in other
privacy-protective strategies that may impact the way they are tracked
online. For instance, they are less likely to say that they have avoided
communicating online when they had sensitive information to share.
About half (52%) report this, compared with 63% of social media users in
wealthier households. Similarly, a smaller share of low-income social
media users say they have set their browsers to turn off cookies or notify
them before receiving a cookie (47% vs. 58%).
Table 2. Privacy Strategies Among Social Media Users by Income
The percentage who responded “yes” to the question: “While using
the Internet, have you ever done any of the following things?”
All social
media users

Less than
$20K

$20K or
more

(a)

(b)

(c)

Used privacy settings to limit who can
see what you post online

76%

65%

79%b

Avoided communicating online when
you had sensitive information to share

60%

52%

63%b

Set your browser to turn off cookies or
notify you before you receive a cookie

56%

47%

58%b

Note: Significant differences within rows are noted with superscript
letters indicating the column to which the item should be compared.
The differences noted here were evaluated with an independent Z-test
for significance at the 95% confidence level. Column (a), which
displays responses for all social media users, is not included in the
significance testing.
Source: Privacy and Security Experience of Low-Socioeconomic
Status Populations Survey, November 18–December 23, 2015,
including an oversample of adults living in households earning less
than $40,000 per year. Interviews were conducted in English and
Spanish. (Total n=3,000 US adults age 18 and older, n=1,613 for
social media users).
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While using privacy settings, self-censoring communications, and
restricting the use of cookies may limit some forms of tracking and
profiling, the kinds of social media data input that are assessed by
algorithmic systems can also include profile information that many users
may not realize has retroactively become publicly available, or is made
accessible to advertisers through third-party apps. For instance, over time,
the information that has been made public by default on networks such as
Facebook has changed considerably.96
As Hartzog et al. notes, the current big data landscape has made it
increasingly difficult for users to effectively restrict access to their
personal disclosures—even when they make well-intended efforts to do
so.
In the past, individuals have been able to roughly gauge whether
aspects of their daily routines and personal disclosures of
information would be safeguarded at any appropriate level of
privacy protection by (sometimes implicitly) guessing the likelihood
their information would be discovered or understood by third parties
who have exploitative or undesirable interests. In the age of big
data, however, the confidence level associated with privacy
prognostication has decreased considerably, even when
conscientious people exhibit due diligence.97
The resulting environment is one in which data brokers are able to glean a
wide array of insights—such as usernames and friend connections—from
social media activity. The FTC’s Data Brokers report documents the
various ways that social media data are being scraped from publicly
available websites and combined with a wide range of other behavioral
data to create and consumer profiles.98 These kinds of practices can affect
consumers across the socioeconomic spectrum, but low-income
populations have been specifically targeted for their vulnerability. As a
Senate Commerce Committee report on data broker practices identified,
the poor have been profiled into various “financially vulnerable” market
segments such as “Rural and Barely Making It,” and “Fragile Families.”99

96. Alessandro Acquisti, Laura Brandimarte & George Loewenstein, Privacy and Human
Behavior in the Age of Information, 347 SCI. 513 (2015), https://perma.cc/THN5-BXSE.
97. Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Big Data in Small Hands, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 81,
84 (2013), https://perma.cc/S2G5-5NSH.
98. FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS, supra note 57, at 13–14.
99.
MAJORITY STAFF OF OFFICE OF OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS, S. COMM. ON COMMERCE,
SCI. & TRANSP., 113TH CONG., A REVIEW OF THE DATA BROKER INDUSTRY: COLLECTION, USE, AND

78

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 95:053

Such lists make it possible for marketers to easily target vulnerable
consumers for dubious financial products such as payday loans, online
classes, or debt relief services.100
The survey results indicate that low-income social media users also
have a range of privacy-related concerns that are more pronounced when
compared with higher income groups.101 Most directly related to this
discussion, low-income users express deeper worries about commercial
data collection. About half (52%) say they are “very concerned” about not
knowing what personal information is being collected about them by
companies or how it is being used, compared with just over a third (37%)
of more affluent social media users.
If the poor are subject to more data collection and surveillance across
an array of institutional interactions in their daily lives, they may
accordingly face greater burdens and vulnerabilities associated with the
inaccuracy of records being fed into data broker profiles. In addition, if
they are less likely to engage in certain privacy-protective behaviors
online, this may further link their social media activity and network
connections to data broker profiles in ways that result in negative
outcomes associated with increasing reliance on algorithmic decisionmaking systems.
The section that follows illustrates three case studies of emerging
practices in using publicly available social media data to inform critical
decisions that can affect low-status individuals’ economic mobility. Social
media sites like Twitter, Reddit, Facebook, and Instagram are a rich trove
of data, much of which is public. One marketer explained that “[i]f Big
Data is the water pouring out of your faucet, then social media is the
reservoir that stream comes from.”102 Facebook, for instance, partners with
a variety of data-brokers, including Acxiom, DataLogix, BlueKai, Epsilon

SALE OF CONSUMER DATA FOR MARKETING PURPOSES 24–26 (2013) (staff report for Sen. Rockefeller
IV, Chairman, S. Comm. of Commerce, Sci. & Transp.).
100. See AARON RIEKE ET AL., UPTURN, CIVIL RIGHTS, BIG DATA, AND OUR ALGORITHMIC
FUTURE: A SEPTEMBER 2014 REPORT ON SOCIAL JUSTICE AND TECHNOLOGY 8 (2014), https://bigdata.
fairness.io/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/2015-04-20-Civil-Rights-Big-Data-and-Our-Algorithmic-Futu
re-v1.2.pdf; UPTURN, LED ASTRAY: ONLINE LEAD GENERATION AND PAYDAY LOANS (2015),
https://perma.cc/UE5J-EGMV.
101. Throughout this section, “low-income social media users” will continue to be defined as
those living in households earning less than $20,000 per year. Comparisons are made with social
media users living in households above that income threshold. Mary Madden, Privacy, Security and
Digital Inequality: How Technology Experiences and Resources Vary Based on Socioeconomic Status
and Race, DATA & SOC’Y RESEARCH INST. (forthcoming 2017).
102. Dennis Hung, The Impact of Big Data on Social Media Marketing Strategies, TECH. CO (Jan.
22, 2016, 11:03 AM), https://tech.co/impact-big-data-social-media-marketing-strategies-2016-01.
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and Experian, to develop more detailed profiles of users combining on and
offline information.103 These data brokers are the largest in the world and
already boast masses of data. (Acxiom claims to have data on 700 million
people; Epsilon a file on every American household; Datalogix “more than
$1 trillion” in offline purchase-based data.)104 Combining these data
sources with the information that Facebook has from online interactions
has allowed the company to develop an ad-targeting system so
sophisticated that it “could hypothetically serve soda ads to teenagers who
recently purchased a soft drink at a convenience store, or diaper ads to
parents who bought baby food at a department store.”105 In the next
section, we provide three examples of how social media data use by big
data systems could contribute to inequality and differentially harm lowincome individuals.
III. CASE STUDIES AND LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Employment
1. The Use of Social Media to Determine Employability
The use of automated assessment methods to determine
“employability” among job candidates has become a desirable feature of
current Applicant Tracking Systems (ATS). ATS software is designed to
simplify the hiring process and automate the review of resumes and
applications for employers, who sometimes face the daunting task of
sifting through thousands (or even millions) of applicants. “Using highly
granular data about workers’ behavior both on and off the job,
entrepreneurs are building models that they claim can predict future job
performance.”106 As early as 2012, industry experts claimed that the vast
majority of Fortune 500 companies were using some kind of ATS system
to screen candidates.107 And a recent article from HR Today suggests that

103. Marketing Partners Directory, FACEBOOK, https://perma.cc/G9EQ-845J (last visited Apr.
2017); Alex Senemar, Facebook Partners with Shadowy ‘Data Brokers’ to Farm Your Information,
SHERBIT (Apr. 25, 2016), https://perma.cc/5MJ2-63FF.
104. Senemar, supra note 103. Also note that Datalogix is owned by Oracle Corporation. See
Oracle and Datalogix, https://perma.cc/YR3R-82VK (last visited June 3, 2017).
105. Senemar, supra note 103.
106. Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 857, 860
(2017).
107. See Lauren Weber, Your Résumé vs. Oblivion: Inundated Companies Resort to Software to
Sift Job Applications for Right Skills, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 4, 2012), https://perma.cc/U3LD-JVPB.
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integrating the screening of social media profiles in Applicant Tracking
Systems is among the top trends in the field: “By integrating the recruiting
platform with such sites as LinkedIn, Facebook, and Twitter, recruiting
teams can post job openings to a worldwide audience, at the same time
mining a potential applicant’s personal profile on social networks for
deeper insights."108
The insights gleaned from social media can serve to weed out
candidates who, for a variety of reasons, may not be seen as the best fit for
the job.109 These assessments can be made from a range of social media
data, including content analysis of social media posts, assessments of
personality type from likes on a social media profile, or analysis of a
potential employee’s network connections to measure their “social capital”
within a certain field.110 As one CEO of a recruitment solutions provider
notes, “[t]he knowledge and data acquired from online social practices
allows recruiters to analyze the successes and shortcomings of candidates
for greater relationship building.”111 In some cases, companies that provide
ATS software offer social media background checks as a separate service
to highlight a candidate’s shortcomings. For instance, InfoCheckUSA
offers a “Not FCRA compliant” social media background check report for
$24.95 that will help employers “see what kind of person you are dealing
with” and will identify activities such as “[e]xcessive Twittering or social
media activity while on the clock.”112
Some companies that provide applicant tracking solutions and
predictive analytics platforms have offered job seekers advice on
navigating the new world of social media assessments as part of the hiring
process. HireVue, a company that promises to help employers screen
“200% more candidates, land 13% more top performers, reduce poor
performer hiring by 17%, and drive turnover down by 28%,”113 published

108. Russ Banham, 2016 Trends in Applicant Tracking Systems, HR TODAY (Feb. 2, 2016),
https://perma.cc/3C3T-D2AD.
109. These practices are not limited to the U.S. and have created a secondary market for tools
targeted at job candidates, such as the UK-based “Social Score” that allows applicants who have been
rejected for a job to “see what employers see” when conducting a social media check. MY SOCIAL
SCORE, https://perma.cc/YAX6-349C.
110. See Cathy O’Neil, How Algorithms Rule our Working Lives, GUARDIAN (Sept. 1, 2016, 1:00
PM), https://www.theguardian.com/science/2016/sep/01/how-algorithms-rule-our-working-lives.
111. Banham, supra note 108 (internal citation omitted).
112. See Social Media Background Check, INFO CHECK USA (Apr. 2017), https://perma.cc/7N
BX-QAE3 (last visited June 3, 2017).
113. See Maximum Recruiter Revenue, HIRE VUE, https://web.archive.org/web/20150911005104/
http://www.hirevue.com/recruiting/.
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this note of caution for job applicants:
Social media can be tricky with their privacy settings. Make sure
you read through every setting and what it can and cannot filter for
you . . . . [P]rofile pictures are public regardless of your profile page
being private or public, so be careful with the content you post and
make sure you understand how your posts are viewed. Social media
can be your greatest asset or your biggest failure.114
While the exact variables that factor into an assessment are difficult to
uncover, some companies provide descriptions of their evaluation process
on their websites. One such company, Social Intelligence, argues that
employers should use their service to “[a]void legal restrictions by
entrusting your social media screening with trusted online private
investigators.”115 The company claims to be the only social media
screening company that has an endorsement from the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) and employs Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)116certified analysts to identify “negative behavior” through a “cyber
investigation” that can help companies to avoid “accusations of
discrimination.”117 FCRA is the federal statute governing credit reporting.
However, the categories of negative content that are highlighted through
the exemplary review on their website are hardly straightforward; for
instance, it is unclear what kinds of statements constitute “potentially
unlawful” behavior, “potentially violent” posts, or what qualifies as
“racism and/or demonstrations of intolerance” or “sexually explicit
material.” It appears to be neither a fully objective nor subjective process,
but is presented as resulting in “accurate and dependable insight.”118
Leaders in the HR profession have been engaged in an ongoing debate
about the ethics of social media monitoring in various forms, but many
companies are forging ahead with various workarounds.119 In some cases,
recruiters are hiring self-described FCRA-compliant companies to perform

114. Emily Hatch, Applying for a Job? Don’t Be Another Social Media Failure!, HIRE VUE (Sept.
25, 2014), https://perma.cc/5BAK-7V5R.
115. Products, SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE (Apr. 2017), https://perma.cc/GK7Y-4JEN.
116. For a detailed discussion of FCRA and its application to hiring, see infra Part III(A)(2)(a).
117. Id.
118. Products, SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE, https://perma.cc/GK7Y-4JEN (last visited June 22, 2017).
119. Johnathan A. Segal & Joyce LeMay, Point/Counterpoint: Should Employers Use Social
Media to Screen Job Applicants?, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (Nov. 1, 2014),
https://perma.cc/DL7Q-4LMZ (“After an applicant has been interviewed, his or her membership in
many protected groups is already known. So, checking his or her LinkedIn profile or Twitter handle is
not likely to reveal much more than HR already knows.”).
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social media background checks on their behalf.120 Researchers seeking to
understand what filters are used to raise red flags about job candidates
found that these indicators can include broad categories such as “At Risk
Populations,” “Potentially Unlawful Activity,” and “Potentially Violent
Behavior” (which includes the sub-filter of “Potentially aggressive
verbiage”).121
While these filters may unfairly exclude many applicants due to the
misinterpretation or miscategorization of the content of their social media
posts or photos, experimental research suggests that some employers may
exclude applicants based solely on descriptive profile information such as
religion.122 Network information—which is made public by default across
many social media sites—can also be used in problematic ways. While
knowing who someone is connected to may provide valuable sourcing
information to recruiters, it has the potential to create new forms of
“networked discrimination” that may fall outside of current legal
regulations, discussed below.123 Overall, algorithms used in ATS systems
and related social media screening services can harm job applicants when
they contain inaccurate data about individuals, when their underlying
statistical models are inaccurate, or when the data outcomes reflect preexisting structural disadvantage.124 And while antidiscrimination law does
not currently restrict economic sorting based on personality, habits, and
character traits, all of these indicators can be revealed through mobile
devices and social media activity.125 In addition, because low-income
social media users are more likely than higher income users to post
content publicly, less likely to feel they have a good understanding of
privacy policies, and less likely to engage in certain protective strategies,

120. See generally ALEX ROSENBLAT, TAMARA KNEESE & DANAH BOYD, DATA & SOC’Y
RESEARCH INST., NETWORKED EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION (2014), https://perma.cc/279L-68TC.
121. Id.
122. ALESSANDRO ACQUISTI & CHRISTINA FONG, AN EXPERIMENT IN HIRING DISCRIMINATION
VIA ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKS (2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2031979 (reporting that when
researchers created two fake social media profiles indicating religious affiliation and submitted job
applications on their behalf to over 4000 employers, the Muslim candidate received a 13% lower
callback rate compared to the Christian candidate.).
123. Rosenblat, et al., supra note 120.
124. Kim, supra note 106, at 874–84 (noting that data analytics can also be used for intentional
discrimination, but that this danger is low given that employers do not need complex algorithms to
discriminate on the basis of highly salient characteristics).
125. Peppet, supra note 25, at 125 (describing the ways in which the Internet of Things—physical
devices embedded with digital data collection, such as fitness trackers and wireless-connected
thermostat controls—may further magnify the proliferation of data streams being used to assess
consumers’ potential value and risk).
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they may inadvertently be subject to a greater range of harms when
evaluated through the use of certain ATS tools.
2. Legal Analysis of Applicant Tracking Systems
There is little legal recourse from inaccurate or discriminatory
employment screening reports due to gaps in existing laws. As boyd et al.
have argued, there are currently no restrictions in place to protect against
discrimination on the basis of one’s personal network, despite the fact that
our laws ban discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, national
origin, and other protected classifications.126 Increasingly, algorithmic
means of decision-making provide new mechanisms through which
discrimination may occur.127
The following section analyzes the major laws governing Applicant
Tracking Systems: the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA),128 which aims
to ensure accurate credit reports, and Title VII,129 which prohibits
employment discrimination. The bottom line is that there are scant legal
limits on commercial data collection, and constraints on uses of data
outputs are minimal. Our legal system largely relies on individuals to
police their own privacy. Since low-income people are less likely to have
confidence in and use privacy settings, they are especially vulnerable to
discriminatory uses of big data by employers.
a. Fair Credit Reporting Act
Applicant Tracking Systems qualify as consumer reporting agencies
(CRAs), which are regulated by FCRA. FCRA was enacted in 1970 to
promote the accuracy, fairness, and privacy of personal information
gathered by CRAs.130 A CRA is an entity that assembles and generates
consumer reports, which contain information “bearing on a consumer's . . .
character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living”

126. danah boyd, Karen Levy & Alice Marwick, The Networked Nature of Algorithmic
Discrimination, in DATA & DISCRIMINATION:COLLECTED ESSAYS 54 (Seeta Pena Gangadharan &
Virginia Eubanks, eds. 2014), https://www.newamerica.org/oti/policy-papers/data-and-discrimination/.
If the social network were used as a proxy to discriminate against a protected class such as race, this
would violate the law, but it would be very hard to prove. See Kim supra note 106, at 884.
127. See boyd, supra note 52, at 664; Kim supra note 106, at 9–10; Barocas & Selbst, supra note
4, at 674.
128. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 (2012).
129. See generally Civil Rights Act of 1964 § tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
130. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1681.
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to determine the consumer’s eligibility for employment, among other
purposes.131 CRAs must use “reasonable procedures to assure maximum
possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about
whom the report relates.”132 The FCRA covers CRAs that use social media
information in their reports,133 which employment background reports
increasingly contain.134
For their part, employers that use consumer reports must provide job
applicants with notice and obtain applicants’ written consent.135 Of course,
in today’s job market, consent is mostly a formality, as few prospective
employees are in a position to withhold it. If the employer then uses the
report to take “adverse action” against the applicant (such as a failure to
hire), the employer must notify the applicant and provide him or her with a
copy of the credit report and a written summary of applicant’s rights.136
The applicant then has a short time period to identify and dispute any
errors in the report, and upon expiration of that deadline, the employer can
take the adverse action.137 Notably, an employer faces no FCRA liability
for failure to hire, whether based on an accurate or inaccurate report.138

131. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1).
132. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b).
133. On May 9, 2011, the FTC issued a letter to a company called Social Intelligence
Corporation, which conducts social media background screening for employers. In the letter, the FTC
clarified that the company is a CRA because it “assembles or evaluates consumer report information
that is furnished to third parties that use such information as a factor for establishing a consumer’s
eligibility for employment.” Letter from Maneesha Mithal, Assoc. Dir., Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Renee
Jackson, Counsel, Soc. Intelligence Corp. (May 9, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/closing_letters/social-intelligence-corporation/110509socialintelligenceletter.pdf. In 2012,
the FTC came to the same conclusion with regard to Spokeo, a data broker that used social media and
other data to create detailed personal profiles of consumers, including information such as “hobbies,
ethnicity, religion, participation on social networking sites, and photos.” Press Release, Fed. Trade
Comm’n, Spokeo to Pay $800,000 to Settle FTC Charges Company Allegedly Marketed Information
to Employers and Recruiters in Violation of FCRA (June 12, 2012), https://perma.cc/WXG2-BBM9.
Spokeo paid a $800,000 fine to resolve allegations that it violated FCRA “by failing to make sure that
the information it sold would be used only for legally permissible purposes; failing to ensure the
information was accurate; and failing to tell users of its consumer reports about their obligation under
the FCRA.” Id. Spokeo also posted fake endorsements of its products. Id.
134. Credit reports used in lending are also increasingly incorporating social network data, along
with “exchanged messages, tagged photos, browsing habits, education, searches, and geo-spatial data
from mobile phones.” Nizan Geslevich Packin & Yafit Lev-Aretz, On Social Credit and the Right to
be Unnetworked, 2016 COLUM. BUS. REV. 339, 344 (2016).
135. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2) (2012) (this disclosure and authorization must be in a separate
document from the employment application).
136. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3).
137. 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(b)(2) (2012).
138. Kim, supra note 106, at 900 (“Thus, fair information practice principles are unlikely to
significantly limit employer use of data models.”).
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In addition, FCRA leaves several other notable gaps. To begin with, it
does not cover employers who gather their own information and conduct
their own background checks, such as by checking prospective employees’
social media accounts or public records accessible on the Internet.139 Some
estimates are that one-fifth to one-quarter of employers research job
applicants themselves, using social networks and search engines.140
Furthermore, many furnishers (entities that provide information to CRAs)
and CRAs evade the FCRA by claiming not to be engaged in consumer
reporting.141
The FTC, which is the primary enforcer of FCRA and privacy law in
general, is sensitive to the big data risks faced by low-income consumers
and job applicants, but does not have the staff or budget to investigate all
these companies.142 The Consumer Financial Protection Board (CFPB)
was recently empowered by Congress to enforce FCRA and has flexed its
muscles, particularly with regard to the legal responsibilities of
furnishers.143 Still, the CFPB is a controversial agency, and its

139. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(2)(A)(i) (2012); see also Peppet, supra note 25, at 128; Amy
Schmitz, Secret Consumer Scores and Segmentations: Separating Consumer “Haves” from “HaveNots,” 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1411, 1426 (2014).
140. Alexander Reicher, The Background of Our Being: Internet Background Checks in the
Hiring Process, 28 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 115, 116 (2013). The FCRA similarly excludes information
about “transactions or experiences between the consumer and the person making the report.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681a(d)(2)(A)(i) (such as information provided by the applicant through a drug test or breathalyzer
test).
141. Kimani Paul-Emile, Beyond Title VII: Rethinking Race, Ex-Offender Status, and
Employment Discrimination in the Information Age, 100 VA. L. REV. 893, 917 (2014).
142. Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Harzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 583, 600–02 (2014) [hereinafter The New Common Law]. Under Section 5 of the FTC
Act, a one-hundred-year-old consumer protection law that far predates the rise of the Internet, the FTC
can challenge businesses that engage in “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce.” Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012). For instance,
under this authority, the FTC has gone after companies that violated their posted privacy policies and
companies that altered privacy policies without consumer consent, as well as companies that failed to
use reasonable and appropriate security practices to safeguard personal information. Solove &
Hartzog, The New Common Law, supra 142, at 628–43 (cataloguing FTC actions as unfair and
deceptive practices jurisdiction). Several of these actions have resulted in consent orders, which have
created a form of common law setting forth best practices regarding data use. Id. at 607. However, the
FTC’s resource limitations and its cautious approach to regulating consumer data privacy make
alternate vehicles of enforcement essential. See Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel Solove, The Scope and
Potential of FTC Data Protection, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230 (2015). Overall, “the FTC’s role is
largely to discourage bad behavior, not to compensate affected parties.” Id. at 2294.
143. Andrew M. Smith & Peter Gilbert, Fair Credit Reporting Act and Financial Update–2015,
71 BUS. LAW 661, 664–67 (2016). The CFPB was created by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a) (2012), in response to the financial crisis of 2008 and
officially became operational in 2011. See generally Leonard J. Kennedy, Patricia A. McCoy & Ethan
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enforcement agenda will likely depend on the prevailing political winds.144
The agency is currently facing a constitutional challenge regarding its
structure.145
The cases the FTC has successfully resolved demonstrate that even
supposedly reputable CRAs often violate the law. For instance, the FTC
sued HireRight, a company that provides criminal background checks to
large companies like Monster and Oracle, for violations such as failing to
provide adverse action notices, failing to conduct investigations of
disputed information, and inaccurate reporting.146 HireRight settled the
case for $2.6 million.147 Likewise, the CFPB brought enforcement actions
against two of the largest employment background screening providers,
which generate more than ten million reports a year, because the reports
contained impermissible information and widespread inaccuracies.148 For
instance, the reports “included criminal records attached to the wrong
consumers, dismissed and expunged records, and misdemeanors reported
as felony convictions.”149 Under the consent order, the companies agreed
to pay $10.5 million in damages to consumers and a penalty of $2.5
million.150 Such blatant violations suggest that these practices may be
widespread within the industry.
Another stumbling block to enforcement is that most people do not
know what information CRAs are reporting about them.151 Furthermore, it
is nearly impossible to know how credit scoring algorithms work because

Bernstein, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Financial Regulation for the Twenty-First
Century, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1141 (2012) (gives account of CFB’s history and scope of authority).
144. Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An Introduction, 32 REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 321, 341–42, 364–69 (20113).
145. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (holding the
agency’s structure unconstitutional and making the Director removable by the President at will). This
judgment was later vacated in PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, No. 15-1177, 2017 U.S.
App. LEXIS 2733 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2017), and the case was heard en banc on May 24, 2017.
146. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Employment Background Screening Company to Pay
$2.6 Million Penalty for Multiple Violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act: FTC Charges HireRight
Solutions Incorrectly Listed Criminal Convictions on Reports of Some Consumers (Aug. 8, 2012),
https://perma.cc/8MR4-AMMM.
147. Id.
148. Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB Takes Action Against Two of the Largest
Employment Background Screening Report Providers for Serious Inaccuracies (Oct. 29, 2015),
https://perma.cc/3AQG-KZYE.
149. Id.
150. Id.; Consent Order, Consumer Protection Financial Bureau, In the Matter of General
Information Services, Inc. and e-Background Checks.com, Inc., File No. 2015-CFPB-0028 (2015).
151. See Paul-Emile, supra note 141, at 926.
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data brokers consider this information a trade secret.152 While data
analytics is touted for its ability to reduce human biases, it often merely
replicates them.153 “Relying on data models instead of human decisionmaking is unlikely to counter structural forms of bias, because these
models take existing workplace structures as givens.”154 Algorithms can
unwittingly import biases encoded by software engineers without any
outside check on that process.155 Perhaps most importantly for the case of
big data analytics, while the FCRA is aimed at ensuring accurate
information, it does not protect job applicants from inaccurate inferences
that are drawn from that information.156 In addition, the assessments
covered by the FCRA are limited to determinations made about an
individual; however, many data-driven scoring tools skirt these boundaries
by making household-level assessments.157
Even if a consumer is aware that she has been denied employment due
to inaccurate information, the process to correct that information is
ineffective for most and favors those who are wealthy and wellconnected.158 Consumers must use an online system that typically results
in a form response,159 a system some have referred to as a “Kafkaesque no
man's land,” 160 that more often than not fails to resolve the problem.161
This is troubling given the high error rates in credit reports.162 The FTC

152. Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated
Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2014).
153. Kim, supra note 106, at 865.
154. Id. at 16. (“[But] data can be a useful tool for diagnosing both cognitive and structural forms
of bias”).
155. Id. at 14; Citron & Pasquale, supra note 152, at 14 (“Credit bureaus may be laundering
discrimination into black-boxed scores, which are immune from scrutiny.”) (footnote omitted).
156. Peppet, supra note 25, at 128.
157. ROBINSON + YU, KNOWING THE SCORE: NEW DATA, UNDERWRITING, AND MARKETING IN
THE CONSUMER CREDIT MARKETPLACE 2 (2014), https://perma.cc/8B4H-76TT (“To avoid regulatory
limits, credit bureaus sell slightly aggregated information, such as the financial circumstances of a
household, rather than an individual. This data can be used to target products to groups of consumers
with great precision, based on the financial health of their household or neighborhood.”).
158. Tara Siegel Bernard, Credit Error? It Pays to Be on V.I.P. List, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2011,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/15/your-money/credit-scores/15credit.html.
159. Chi Chi Wu, Automated Injustice: How a Mechanized Dispute System Frustrates Consumers
Seeking to Fix Errors in Their Credit Reports, 14 N.C. BANKING INST. 139, 157-61 (2010).
160. Bernard, supra note 158.
161. FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 319 OF THE FAIR AND
ACCURATE CREDIT TRANSACTIONS ACT OF 2003 21 (2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/reports/section-319-fair-accurate-credit-transactions-act-2003-sixth-interim-final-reportfederal-trade/150121factareport.pdf.
162. Maureen Mahoney, Errors and Gotchas: How Credit Report Errors and Unreliable Credit
Scores Hurt Consumers, CONSUMERS UNION 7–12 (Apr. 9, 2014), https://perma.cc/6PBP-PPWY
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reported that one in five credit reports contains errors, and overall, 5% of
reports have errors that could result in a denial of credit.163 Error rates are
similarly high with regard to CRAs’ criminal history reporting, which is
plagued with false positive and false negative identifications, the reporting
of expunged and sealed information, and other similar errors.164
Furthermore, litigation brought against CRAs to challenge the accuracy
of their reporting faces an uphill struggle, given that courts have
interpreted the accuracy provision in FCRA as requiring “only that the
consumer reporting agency must follow reasonable procedures to assure”
accuracy.165 In short, the burden on CRAs to be accurate is minimal.166
Even the most accurate consumer report could contain information
gathered about an individual from social media posts by themselves and
their networks. This information may be “accurately” reported by a CRA,
but subject to devastating and incorrect inferences by employers.
Private enforcement is barred altogether for certain FCRA protections.
For instance, private litigants cannot sue furnishers for reporting
inaccurate information about them.167 Rather, consumers can only sue a

(describing errors due to mining together records for different people who share similar identification,
stale information, inaccurate information, and identity theft).
163. FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 319 OF THE FAIR AND
ACCURATE CREDIT TRANSACTIONS ACT OF 2003 iv-vi (2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/reports/section-319-fair-and-accurate-credit-transactions-act-2003-fifth-interim-federal-tra
de-commission/130211factareport.pdf.
164. Paul-Emile, supra note 141, at 908. On the range of data inaccuracies associated with
information technology, see Elizabeth D. De Armond, Frothy Chaos: Modern Data Warehousing and
Old-Fashioned Defamation, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1061, 1075–89 (2007).
165. Koropoulos v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 734 F.2d 37, 42 (D.C. Cir. 1984). For a summary of the
range of court interpretations on the “maximum possible accuracy requirement,” see Elizabeth Doyle
O’Brien, Comment, Minimizing the Risk of the Undeserved Scarlet Letter: An Urgent Call to Amend §
1681E(B) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 1217, 1227–36 (2008).
166. Lawsuits challenging companies’ technical violations, such as a failure to provide separate
disclosure and authorization forms, have fared much better. See Roy Maurer, Know Before You Hire:
2016 Employment Screening Trends, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (Jan. 20, 2016),
https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/talent-acquisition/pages/2016-employmentscreening-trends.aspx. According to reports, class actions settled in 2015 included cases against BMW,
Calvin Klein, Chuck E. Cheese, Food Lion, Home Depot, and Whole Foods, with settlements ranging
from $716,000 to $3 million. See David N. Anthony & Julie D. Hoffmeister, The Fair Credit
Reporting Act: Not Just About Credit, BUS. L. TODAY (June 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/
publications/blt/2016/06/13_anthony.html; Thomas Ahearn, Class Action Lawsuits Will Continue to
Increase in Target Rich Background Screening Environment in 2016, EMPLOYMENT SCREENING
RESOURCES, Dec. 28, 2015, http://www.esrcheck.com/wordpress/2015/12/28/fcra-lawsuits-willcontinue-to-increase-in-target-rich-background-screening-environment-in-2016/.
167. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681s-2(c)(1), (d) (2012); Hopson v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, 14 F. Supp. 3d
774, 789–90 (S.D. Miss. 2014); Stafford v. Cross Country Bank, 262 F. Supp. 2d 776, 782–83 (W.D.
Ky. 2003) (holding that furnishers can be sued by private consumers only for failure to properly
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furnisher for failing to conduct an investigation.168 In addition, Congress
barred private rights of action to enforce employer (and other end users of
consumer reports) obligations to provide adverse action notices.169
Furthermore, state tort law does not fill the gap because the FCRA
preempts most state law claims.170 Thus, a consumer has limited recourse
for a FCRA violation tied to use of an ATS report.171
b. Employment Discrimination Law
Under federal law, employers cannot discriminate on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, national origin, disability, age (over forty), genetic
information, or military service.172 If an employer uses an ATS report to
draw inferences about an applicant’s protected characteristics and then
denies them employment, it might be charged with disparate treatment.173
Or, if the algorithms underlying ATS generate hiring recommendations
that disfavor protected groups, applicants might have a claim for disparate
impact.174 These are the two main forms of legally cognizable employment
discrimination.175 Yet as explained below, the algorithmic nature of the

investigate a consumer’s dispute transmitted by a CRA).
168. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b).
169. 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(h)(8) (an employer is required to notify a rejected applicant after taking
the adverse action and the notice should contain contact information of the CRA informing the
applicant of their rights to dispute the accuracy of the report). On the barriers to private enforcement,
see Alexandra P. Everhart Sickler, The (Un)fair Credit Reporting Act, 28 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV.
238, 256, 265–80 (2016).
170. 15 U.S.C. 1681h(e). See generally Elizabeth D. De Armond, A Dearth of Remedies, 113
PENN. ST. L. REV. 1, 7–9 (2008).
171. Class action plaintiffs’ lawyers have had success suing companies for technical violations of
FCRA, unrelated to the accuracy of information, such as failure to use a standalone disclosure form.
See Anthony & Hoffmeister, supra note 166, at 2. But see Just v. Target Corp., 187 F. Supp. 3d 1064
(D. Minn. 2016) (rejecting FCRA class action because employer conduct was not willful). However,
these suits may falter in light of the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Spokeo v. Robins, holding that
plaintiffs must establish an injury in fact that is both concrete and particularized. 136 S. Ct. 1540
(2016). A pure statutory violation with no other impacts may not meet this standard.
172. 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq. For an overview of Title VII protections, see Robert Sprague,
Welcome to the Machine: Privacy and Workplace Implications of Predictive Analytics, 21 RICH. J.L. &
TECH. 12, 13, 35 (2015).
173. For a recent court discussion on disparate treatment, see Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 1338, 1345 (2015).
174. Id.
175. For a clear and recent explanation of the standards used to prove the different employment
discrimination causes of action, see generally Deborah L. Brake, The Shifting Sands of Employment
Discrimination: From Unjustified Impact to Disparate Treatment in Pregnancy and Pay, 105 GEO.
L.J. 559 (2017).
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data mining that underlies ATS is unlikely to result in a successful lawsuit
under either theory176—even though big data can “reproduce existing
patterns of discrimination, inherit the prejudice of prior decision-makers,
or simply reflect the widespread biases that persist in society.”177
An employer would clearly be engaging in disparate treatment if it
used ATS reports as a mask to engage in forbidden discrimination.178 Even
if ATS reports scrub out references to protected characteristics, which is
one of their selling points as a way to reduce employers’ legal liability,179
other variables in the report could serve as proxies for identifying group
memberships. While this is certainly possible, employers are unlikely to
use ATS as a cover for intentional discrimination. As Barocas and Selbst
explain, “most cases of employment discrimination are already sufficiently
difficult to prove; employers motivated by conscious prejudice would have
little to gain by pursuing these complex and costly [data mining]
mechanisms to further mask their intentions.”180 Even if an employer were
purposefully discriminating, disparate treatment cases are hard to win,
especially without a smoking gun, such as an employer’s discriminatory
comments. One would search in vain for a smoking gun in ATS reports,
because “these models simply mine the available data, looking for
statistical correlations that connect seemingly unrelated variables, such as
patterns of social media behavior, with workplace performance.”181
Accordingly, ATS reports are more likely to reflect or foster implicit bias,
through which unconscious stereotypes are used to make decisions.
Although scholars have crafted compelling theories for finding implicit
bias liability,182 courts are very wary of recognizing this “second
generation” form of discrimination. Instead, they are looking for bad
actors with intentional animus.183 Other data mining dangers are similarly
devoid of conscious intent—such as erroneous data or replication of

176. Kim, supra note 106, at 866 (arguing that the disparate impact provision of Title VII should
be interpreted and used to combat what she terms “classification bias,” or employer reliance on “data
algorithms, to sort or score workers in ways that worsen inequality or disadvantage along the lines of
race, sex, or other protected characteristics.”).
177. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 673–74.
178. Kim, supra note 106, at 884–85.
179. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 714.
180. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 693 (footnote omitted).
181. Kim, supra note 106, at 866.
182. See generally e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Employment Discrimination
Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997 (2006); Susan Sturm, Second
Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001).
183. Brake, supra note 175, at 570–74.
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structural biases embedded within the workplace—and thus fail to meet
the courts’ demands.184
Because ATS use is unlikely to trigger conscious discrimination,
disparate impact doctrine appears a better fit, but it is similarly constrained
as a remedy. Under Title VII, an employer cannot use facially neutral
policies or practices that have a disparate impact on a protected class,
unless those policies or practices are justified by a legitimate business
need that cannot be reasonably achieved by other means.185 Even in the
absence of big data, disparate impact cases are notoriously hard to win due
to the complexity and expense of obtaining the necessary statistical
evidence to demonstrate a disparate impact,186 judicial biases against
employment plaintiffs and a concomitant belief that discrimination is a
relic of the past, a lack of understanding about how unconscious bias
works,187 and courts’ willingness to accept employers’ proffered
justifications for business necessity.188
When big data is added to the mix, as Barocas and Selbst have pointed
out, disparate impact is particularly difficult to establish.189 This is because
courts approve of employer hiring criteria that are job related, and
computer models have the benefit of accessing massive amounts of data

184. Kim, supra note 106, at 887.
185. This framework was established in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The
Supreme Court held that Title VII prohibits not only intentional discrimination, but also practices and
policies that have a discriminatory impact upon employees. Id. The Court struck down an employer’s
job requirement for high school diplomas and certain test scores because there was an adverse impact
on African-Americans and the requirements were not necessary to perform the power plant jobs at
issue. Id.
186. See Sprague, supra note 172, at 40; Paul-Emile, supra note 141, at 926 (“[T]he fact
that criminal records discrimination occurs almost exclusively during the hiring stage makes it difficult
for an aggrieved applicant to acquire the empirical data necessary to show how the employer has
treated similarly situated applicants.”).
187. Disparate impact theory struggles to accommodate implicit bias claims because the legal
standard focuses on a neutral employer policy, and thus fails “to consider the role of the individual
decision-maker whose discrimination led to an adverse employment action.” Audrey J. Lee,
Unconscious Bias Theory in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 40 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 481,
491 (2005).
188. See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701,
706 (2006); Michael Selmi, Why are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L.
REV. 555, 561–62 (2001); Ann C. McGinley, Ricci v. DeStefano: Diluting Disparate Impact and
Redefining Disparate Treatment, 12 NEV. L.J. 626 (2001); Susan D. Carle, A Social Movement History
of Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis, 63 FLA. L. REV. 251, 257 (2011); Barocas & Selbst, supra note
4, at 707 (“[C]ourts tend to accept most common business practices for which an employer has a
plausible story.”).
189. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 707–12 (describing the multiple hurdles for raising a
disparate impact claim in the context of big data).
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that are highly predictive of future performance.190 Moreover, much data
collection and mining incorporates unconscious bias that is baked into
current structural disparities, making it hard for plaintiffs to identify
alternative employment practices that achieve the same goals while being
less discriminatory, as Title VII requires.191
The challenges of establishing disparate impact claims are seen with
regard to credit checks and criminal records—both of which may be part
of ATS reports—but which also have longer histories as standalone preemployment screening tools. Poor credit and criminal records are more
prevalent in minority communities than among whites, thus their use has
an adverse impact on the hiring of minorities.192 Disparities in credit
particularly impact African-Americans and result from historic patterns of
discrimination that have created a racial wealth gap, as well as predatory
lending practices targeting minority communities.193 Similar disparities
plague minorities with regard to criminal records, as a result of
disproportionate policing and arrests in minority communities.194 At the
same time, studies do not find a predictive connection between these
personal characteristics and job performance for most jobs.195
Accordingly, civil rights groups have advocated against the use of both
these criteria in hiring. 196
In 2012, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
issued guidance seeking to reduce the disparate impact of criminal
background checks upon minorities197 (the EEOC has not issued

190. Id. at 707–08.
191. Id. at 710–11.
192. With regard to credit checks, see Pooja Shethji, Note, Credit Checks Under Title VII:
Learning from the Criminal Background Check Context, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 989, 997–1002 (2016).
Half of employers conduct credit checks in hiring. Id. at 991. With regard to criminal background
checks, see Paul-Emile, supra note 141, 894–97; PERSIS S. YU & SHARON M. DIETRICH, NAT’L
CONSUMER LAW CTR., BROKEN RECORDS: HOW ERRORS BY CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKING
COMPANIES HARM WORKERS AND BUSINESSES (2012), https://perma.cc/WQM7-TS83.
193. AMY TRAUB, DEMOS, DISCREDITED: HOW EMPLOYMENT CREDIT CHECKS KEEP QUALIFIED
WORKERS OUT OF A JOB 7, 9 (2013), https://perma.cc/V9AD-G5L5.
194. See Paul-Emile, supra note 141, at 910–15.
195. Id. at 895 (criminal background checks); Shethji, supra note 192, at 991 (credit checks).
196. See, e.g., Lydell Bridgeford, Q&A: Hiring Practices on the NAACP Legal Defense Fund’s
Radar, BNA LAB. AND EMP. BLOG, Apr. 8, 2013, https://www.bna.com/qa-hiring-practicesb17179873189/. The “ban the box” movement advocates against required criminal background
disclosures in job applications. See Dallan F. Flake, When Any Sentence is a Life Sentence:
Employment Discrimination Against Ex-Offenders, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 45, 92-95 (2015).
197. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, NO. 915.002 EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE:
CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER TITLE
VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (2012), https://perma.cc/Q4DN-DNZQ.
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guidelines with regard to credit checks).198 The criminal background check
guidelines assert that it is unlawful for employers to adopt blanket no-hire
policies for people with criminal backgrounds.199 Instead, the EEOC
advises employers to conduct individualized assessments of job candidates
with criminal backgrounds prior to excluding them from a position. The
guidance generated an immediate backlash from the business community,
which complained about the “catch-22” of conducting criminal
background checks and being held in violation of Title VII or failing to
conduct a check and being held liable for negligent hiring.200 Regardless of
the merits of the guidance, subsequent EEOC disparate impact litigation
based on credit and criminal background checks has faltered, as courts
have found the plaintiff’s proof inadequate.201 At bottom, courts may be
concerned about their role in remedying the complexities of societal
discrimination that precede and extend far beyond an employer’s decision
to conduct a criminal background or credit check. Such reluctance is likely
to plague evaluations of ATS systems, which aggregate multiple sources
of data and thus attenuate the employer’s responsibility for the patterns
that emerge.
Social network data muddies the waters even more. Recently, some
credit reporting companies have begun gleaning data from social media
networks, thereby impacting the credit rating not only of the person
subject to the report, but also the credit of third parties within that person’s
networks.202 In other words, everyone’s creditworthiness is impacting the
entire network. Because ATS evaluations typically include credit
information, it may be sweeping in these relational inferences from credit
check companies, as well as generating them directly from social
networks. This dynamic, in which social networks generate inferences
about a person’s job worthiness, raises the theoretical potential of

198.
199.
200.

See Shethji, supra note 192, at 992.
See supra note 197.
HANS VON SPAKOVSKY, HERITAGE FOUND., THE DANGEROUS IMPACT OF
BARRING CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS: CONGRESS NEEDS TO OVERRULE THE EEOC’S
NEW EMPLOYMENT “GUIDELINES” (2012), https://perma.cc/T5UV-LJMG; John D. Bible, To Check or
Not to Check: New EEOC Enforcement Guidance on the Use of Criminal History Information in
Making Hiring Decisions, BUS. L. TODAY, MAR. 2013, https://www.americanbar.org/publications/
blt/2013/03/05_bible.html.
201. See, e.g., EEOC v. Kaplan Higher Educ. Corp., 748 F.3d 749 (6th Cir. 2014) (rejecting a
disparate impact challenge to employer use of credit histories in hiring); EEOC v. Freeman, 961 F.
Supp. 2d 783, 789 (D. Md. 2013), aff’d, 778 F.3d 463 (4th Cir. 2015) (rejecting a disparate impact
challenge to employer use of criminal background checks).
202. Packin & Lev-Aretz, supra note 134, at 386.
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associational discrimination claims under Title VII.203 Under this theory,
courts have recognized disparate treatment claims brought by plaintiffs
whose employers took adverse actions against them because they had
relationships with persons of another race or national origin.204 For
instance, courts have applied associational discrimination to cases in
which a white man claimed he was not hired due to his marriage to a black
woman,205 a white woman asserted her employer refused to renew her
contract because she associated with “Spanish citizens,”206 and a white
man alleged discriminatory discharge for having a biracial daughter.207 As
one court explained, “where an employee is subjected to adverse action
because an employer disapproves of interracial association, the employee
suffers discrimination because of the employee’s own race.”208 These
cases support the principle that employees should be able to associate with
people of their own choosing without employers drawing negative
conclusions from those relationships.
Big data discrimination may run afoul of this principle. Yet, despite its
theoretical appeal, there are practical barriers to associational

203. While Title VII does not directly address this theory one way or the other, the Americans
with Disabilities Act expressly forbids associational discrimination, meaning that an employee cannot
be discriminated against for having an association with a person with a known disability. 42 U.S.C. §
12112(b)(4) (2012). The EEOC explains: “The purpose of the association provision is to prevent
employers from taking adverse actions based on unfounded stereotypes and assumptions about
individuals who associate with people who have disabilities.” Questions and Answers About the
Association Provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N (Feb. 2, 2011), https://perma.cc/Z8GY-M64K.
204. See Victoria Schwartz, Title VII: A Shift from Sex to Relationships, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER
209, 215–32 (2012) (summarizing the theory and cases); see also Matthew Clark, Stating a Title VII
Claim for Sexual Orientation Discrimination in the Workplace: The Legal Theories Available After
Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, 51 UCLA L. REV. 313, 329 (2003).
205. Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 1986).
206. Reiter v. Ctr. Consol. School Dist., 618 F. Supp. 1458, 1459 (D. Colo. 1985).
207. See Tetro v. Elliot Popham Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick & GMC Trucks, Inc., 173 F.3d 988,
994 (6th Cir. 1999); see also Gresham v. Waffle House, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1442, 1445 (N.D. Ga. 1984)
(a white woman asserted she was fired due to her marriage to a black man); Barrett v. Whirlpool
Corp., 543 F. Supp. 2d 812, 826 (M.D. Tenn. 2008) (a white woman claimed she suffered a hostile
work environment due to her friendship with an African-American male co-worker); DeffenbaughWilliams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581 (5th Cir. 1998), vacated on other grounds by,
Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 182 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1999) (a white plaintiff claimed she was
discharged due to her dating and marriage to a black person); Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130,
132 (2d Cir. 2008) (white basketball coach claimed discriminatory discharge based on his marriage to
a black woman). The EEOC has applied the theory to sexual orientation discrimination as well.
Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641 (E.E.O.C. July 15, 2015),
https://perma.cc/L8Q6-XHYC.
208. Holcomb, 521 F.3d at 139.
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discrimination claims in the big data context. To begin with, successful
associational discrimination cases involve intentional acts by employers
motivated by conscious bias, and are thus framed as disparate treatment
claims. By contrast, big data discrimination is likely to be unintentional, as
data mining involves statistical correlations that do not require conscious
efforts to target specific groups. Thus, it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to ascertain the role that any specific social network data
played in an ATS report that generated conclusions about a potential
employee’s likely job performance or tenure or other job-related
characteristic. Job applicants would not explicitly be turned away from
jobs because employers do not approve of their online friends. Rather,
algorithms may conclude that the applicant’s friends have characteristics
that bear on the applicant’s own suitability for the job. This is potentially
problematic, but it does not fit within the current associational
discrimination paradigm.
Discrimination law is also not a promising avenue when it comes to
discrimination against the poor, whether intentional or unconscious.
Employment law simply does not extend to discrimination on the basis of
social class, even though decisions based on social media searches might
“further disadvantage the poor by subjecting them to the negative
judgments of those who control important resources[,]” such as
employers.209 For instance, obesity and smoking are more prevalent in
low-income communities, and social media that reveals these traits may
result in reputational harm that limits opportunities.210 Certain clothing
styles or social behaviors are also associated with poor communities and
operate as signals of social class.211 This is problematic because poverty
carries social stigma in America—our governing ideology blames poverty
on individual moral failings rather than structural dislocations in the
economy.212 Yet even intentional discrimination against the poor is
perfectly legal and ATS will likely capture these indicia of poverty. Thus,
these networked inferences, when implemented widely and without
recourse, risk further dampening social mobility and trapping individuals
in unemployment or low-wage employment.

209. Thomas H. Koenig & Michael L. Rustad, Digital Scarlet Letters: Social Media
Stigmatization of the Poor and What Can Be Done, 93 NEB. L. REV. 592, 611 (2015).
210. Id. at 600–01.
211. Id. at 595.
212. Id. at 598.

96

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 95:053

B. Higher Education
1. Big Data Tools Impacting Access to Higher Education
Education is often cited as one of the primary pathways out of poverty,
but increasingly, the online behavior of low-income applicants may
influence whether or not they are recruited for or ultimately gain entrance
to college. Big-data driven insights are being used to help create
efficiencies at various stages in the college admissions lifecycle, from
marketing and recruitment to selection and retention. Some of these efforts
are intended to reduce economic inequalities in access to higher education.
For instance, in order to more effectively target college marketing
materials to high-achieving, low-income students, certain institutions are
using large-scale datasets to provide customized recommendations of
“high-quality colleges and universities” for students who are likely to be
admitted based on their previous academic performance.213
Other efforts are more focused on improving the admissions decisionmaking process and increasing graduation rates. As colleges increasingly
look for ways to differentiate students, some are using predictive modeling
tools that consider a wide range of factors beyond traditional application
materials, such as how many friends and photos they have on social media
platforms.214
The general practice of reviewing applicants’ social media profiles is
becoming more common among admissions officers. A recent Kaplan Test
Prep survey of close to 400 college admissions officers across the United
States found that 40% of admissions officers now say they visit applicants’
social media pages to learn more about them, up from 10% in 2008.215
Yet, the Kaplan questions measure a fairly basic form of checking up on
students’ digital footprints that still requires a certain level of judgment
and discretion on the part of the reviewer. By contrast, when a student’s
social media data are fed into a third-party predictive analytics system, the
reviewer may not understand what variables are factoring into a student’s
score or how each one is weighted and why.

213. Ben Castleman, Big Data, Meet Behavioral Science, BROOKINGS (Mar. 10, 2016),
https://perma.cc/G2D2-QZQH.
214. Emmanuel Felton, Colleges Shift to Using ‘Big Data’—Including from Social Media—in
Admissions Decisions, HECHINGER REP. (Aug. 21, 2015), https://perma.cc/428S-QJLR.
215. Press Release, Kaplan, Kaplan Test Prep Survey: Percentage of College Admissions Officers
Who Check Out Applicants’ Social Media Profiles Hits New High; Triggers Include Special Talents,
Competitive Sabotage (Jan. 13, 2016), https://perma.cc/TJ74-B3WR.
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This raises a number of ethical questions regarding the fairness,
accuracy and transparency of this process: How can admissions staff be
certain that a system has captured the correct social media profile for an
applicant? How do these systems evaluate the value of a student’s online
network and interactions? Should a student be held liable for the way their
extended family members or friends or other connections behave on social
media? And how does the absence of a social media footprint (if one
chooses to opt-out or restrict content) affect one’s standing?
Even as these systems strive to create a better fit between prospective
students and their schools, there can also be strong economic incentives
driving the adoption of predictive modeling tools. The higher “yield” (i.e.,
demand) that a school can demonstrate to its creditors, the more it can save
in reduced interest rates and improve overall rankings in lists such as the
U.S. News and World Report ratings for universities.216 IBM, one of the
leading providers of big data-driven assessment tools for higher education,
describes the social media value proposition as follows:
Analyzing social media engagements not only provides insight on a
candidate’s personal interests, but, over time, analysis can also
determine the behaviors of those who are likely to enroll and
complete a degree program. Social media monitoring platforms
generate real-time insights on content type and photos posted by
current students and alumni, which can lead to a better idea of the
kind of social media behavior to look for in a pool of candidates. In
addition to peer interaction on their personal social media accounts,
a candidate’s interaction on a university’s social media channels can
be of interest to an admissions officer.217
It is unclear to what extent students realize that their social data streams
might be fed into these kinds of assessments and how this awareness gap
may affect different socioeconomic groups. Media reports have suggested
that knowledge of social media monitoring by college admissions officers
may be influencing more students to “clean up” their profiles before
applying to college.218 However, even if a student successfully sanitizes

216. Tim Lloyd, How College Applications Change in the Era of Big Data, MARKETPLACE (Jan.
14, 2014, 2:10 PM), https://perma.cc/C5P3-VMDV.
217. Lauren Willison, 3 Ways Universities Are Leveraging Big Data Analytics for Recruitment
and Retention, IBM BIG DATA & ANALYTICS HUB BLOG (Mar. 4, 2016), https://perma.cc/SC8U5XUQ.
218. Natasha Singer, Toning Down the Tweets Just in Case Colleges Pry, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19,
2014, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/20/technology/college-applicants-sanitize-
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his or her own profile, the aforementioned method of social media
monitoring may also include analysis of one’s extended network of family
and friends. Due to the networked nature of social media, that can create
an extra layer of challenges to maintaining the kind of idealized online
presence that recruiters would like to see.
Former FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez has referred to this type of
data-driven decision making as “data determinism,” and cautioned that
access to education may be one of the many areas impacted by a reliance
on algorithmic assessments.
Individuals may be judged not because of what they’ve done, or
what they will do in the future, but because inferences or
correlations drawn by algorithms suggest they may behave in ways
that make them poor credit or insurance risks, unsuitable candidates
for employment or admission to schools or other institutions, or
unlikely to carry out certain functions.219
Scholars who study the role of social media in education have raised
concerns about the fairness of reviewing personal profiles as part of the
admissions process, and the ways in which it might discriminate against
those who have a lower level of proficiency in social media privacy
management.220 As one dean of admissions, quoted in an article about big
data-driven trends in college admissions, notes, “[t]his is the kind of stuff
that savvy parents, students, and college counselors know about.”221 This
begs the question: How are less savvy parents and students, and those who
may not have regular engagement with college counselors, faring in this
new environment? If lower-income social media users’ profiles are more
accessible than higher-income users, and analysis of their network
connections is more likely to reflect an entrenched set of structural
disadvantages, then the conclusions drawn from these analyses will
replicate those inequities.

online-profiles-as-college-pry.html?_r=0.
219. Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Keynote Address at the Technology
Policy Institute Aspen Forum: Privacy Challenges in the Era of Big Data: A View from the
Lifeguard’s Chair (Aug. 19, 2013), https://perma.cc/5VA9-8U97.
220. Rey Junco, The Ethics of Facebook-Stalking University Applicants, SOC. MEDIA HIGHER
EDUC. (Nov. 8, 2012), https://perma.cc/UJM6-5ET7.
221. Felton, supra note 214.
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2. Legal Analysis of Predictive Analytics in College Admissions
The use of predictive analytics generated from big data sources such as
social media postings, test scores, and demographic data faces few legal
limits. No law prohibits colleges from gathering information about
students from social media or other publicly available information.
With regard to the use of data, there are two main legal doctrines
potentially at issue: Title VI of the Civil Rights Act,222 which prohibits
discrimination in education, and the Family Education Rights and Privacy
Act (FERPA),223 which governs the confidentiality of student records.
One major concern about predictive analytics in the higher education
sphere is that minority college applicants will be disproportionately
excluded from admissions. Colleges are looking to identify metrics of
student retention and success,224 and the metrics they are using may
unintentionally harm minorities. This is a problem of disparate impact, in
which a facially neutral process has a differential impact on minority
groups.225 The gathering and analysis of big data can look particularly
“neutral,” given that computers do the work based on seemingly objective
criteria. This neutrality may be a mirage, however, because software
engineers craft code that can unintentionally embed social and cognitive
biases into the analytics. If minorities are denied admission as a result,
they might have a disparate impact claim under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act (similar to the sort of claim discussed above in connection with
employment).
Title VI provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”226 It covers
almost all colleges and universities, both public and private.227 Title VI
allows individuals to seek relief in court for intentional discrimination, but
it does not include language barring disparate impact.228 Nevertheless, the

222. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012).
223. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012).
224. See Ry Rivard, Predicting Where Students Go, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Sept. 19, 2014),
https://perma.cc/F5RR-Z5UB.
225. See supra note 177 (describing disparate impact in the employment context).
226. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012).
227. Office for Civil Rights, Race and Origin Discrimination: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S.
DEP’T OF EDUC., https://perma.cc/YZ3Q-5B86 (last visited June 22, 2017).
228. Olatunde C.A. Johnson, The Agency Roots of Disparate Impact, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
125, 130 (2014) (discussing statutory and regulatory interpretations of Title VI).
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Department of Education (DOE) has adopted disparate impact theory by
issuing regulations that prohibit practices that have the “effect of”
discriminating on the basis of race, color, or ethnicity.229
Only the DOE can enforce a Title VI disparate impact claim; private
citizens cannot.230 A student or other individual can trigger a DOE
investigation by filing a complaint with the DOE’s Office of Civil
Rights.231 The test for disparate impact claims in the educational context is
borrowed from the employment context of Title VII.232 Under this test, the
plaintiff must first show that the practice in question results in a significant
disparity in the provision of a benefit or service that is based on race or
national origin.233 The burden then shifts to the college, who must
demonstrate that the policy has a “substantial legitimate justification.”234 If
the college meets its burden, it can still be liable if alternative practices
exist that would meet the college’s educational goals and result in lower
disparities.235
Using this framework, scholars and advocates have crafted disparate
impact theories designed to challenge the use of SAT scores as well as
criminal background checks in admissions, both of which may
disproportionately exclude minorities. In brief, the argument is that use of
these data points have a disproportionately harmful impact on black and
Hispanic students, that the data is correlated to low-income status but not
to future success (for SATs) or unsafe behavior (for criminal background),
and that there are less discriminatory alternatives for predicting
educational outcomes (the college’s justification for SAT scores) and

229. 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2).
230. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281 (2001) (holding that the disparate impact Title VI
regulations are not privately enforceable). For a critique of Sandoval, see Johnson, supra note 228, at
131–32.
231. Office for Civil Rights, Education and Title VI, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://perma.cc/
JH6N-XXX9 (last visited June 22, 2017).
232. See Rebecca R. Ramaswamy, Bars to Education: The Use of Criminal History Information
in College Admissions, 5 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 145, 154–55 (2015) (describing the burden shifting
framework for disparate impact set forth in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642
(1989)); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TITLE VI LEGAL MANUAL 49–50 (2001).
233. See, e.g., Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 393 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[T]he courts of appeals have
generally agreed that the parties' respective burdens in a Title VI disparate impact case should follow
those developed in Title VII cases.”); Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia,
775 F.2d 1403, 1418 (11th Cir. 1985) (applying Title VII’s burden-shifting test to Title VI disparate
impact litigation); Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 982 n.9 (9th Cir. 1984).
234. Powell, 189 F.3d. at 393.
235. Id. at 394.
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student safety (the justification for criminal background checks).236
In a legal challenge to the use of the SATs in the Title IX context
(prohibiting educational discrimination on the basis of gender), a federal
court ruled that New York State’s exclusive reliance on SAT scores to
award merit-based college scholarships had a disparate impact on
women.237 Similarly, the DOE’s Office of Civil Rights is currently
investigating a Florida scholarship program that relies heavily on strict
SAT and ACT score cut-offs as criteria and that awards most scholarships
to white and affluent families.238 While no legal case has been brought
testing this theory against criminal background checks, there is sustained
advocacy in this area. In February 2016, the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil
Rights Under Law called on the organization that administers the
Common Application—a standardized college application form used by
more than 600 colleges—to cease using questions about applicants’
educational disciplinary histories, criminal records, and juvenile justice
backgrounds.239 In 2015, New York University announced that it would
review applications “without awareness of whether the applicant checked
the box” regarding past crimes, and if a student with a criminal
background passes that stage, the decision then goes to a team of
admissions officers “specially trained on fact-based assessment and issues
of bias.”240 The University explained that this would strike a balance
between educating a diverse group of students and ensuring the safety of
the campus community.241
Ultimately, grassroots advocacy might be the best strategy for
challenging big data in admissions. As noted above with regard to
employment, disparate impact cases are generally hard to win.242 To begin
with, there is no protection for discrimination based on poverty, even
though it is disproportionately associated with minorities. Even if any

236. See Ramaswamy, supra note 232, at 154–62 (regarding criminal background checks);
Kimberly West-Faulcon, The River Runs Dry: When Title VI Trumps State Anti-Affirmative Action
Laws, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1075, 1124–1131 (2009) (regarding SAT scores).
237. Sharif v. New York State Educ. Dep’t, 709 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
238. David Smiley, Michael Vasquez & Kathleen McGrory, Feds Investigate Florida’s Bright
Futures Scholarships, MIAMI HERALD (Mar. 22, 2014, 4:00 PM), https://perma.cc/D2SQ-FB5Z.
239. Press Release, Stacie Burgess, Lawyer’s Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Lawyers
Committee Calls for the Common Application to Eliminate Discriminatory Barriers to College
Admissions Nationwide (Feb. 18, 2016), https://perma.cc/FS5W-RCFS.
240. Press Release, N.Y. Univ., NYU Revises Admissions Practices for Applicants Convicted of
a Crime (May 23, 2015), https://perma.cc/969W-U5FG.
241. Id.
242. See supra notes 186–188 and accompanying text.
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adverse impact of big data in admissions falls clearly on minorities (as
opposed to poor applicants in general), a plaintiff who suspects he or she
is a victim of disparate impact through predictive analytics would have to
convince DOE to investigate the case. Even if DOE pursued a case,
litigation in this area is difficult to win due to the statistical demands of
proving disparate impact, as well as judicial deference to college
determinations about educational necessity.243 Further, the very theory of
disparate impact in the educational context is highly contested given that
the statute does not explicitly permit it. Big data makes proof of disparate
impact even harder. The process of aggregation makes it difficult to
identify a specific variable that is linked to a disparate impact, as courts
require.244 As Jules Polonetsky and Omer Tene write, “the hallmark of big
data is the escape of information from the confines of a structured database
and the ability to harvest, analyze, rearrange, and reuse freestanding
information.”245
Not surprisingly then, the legal and social movements against the use
of SATs and criminal background checks do not tackle the far murkier
issue of how social media information is being used to make decisions
about student admissions. Pointing to the SATs as a discriminatory culprit
is straightforward; disentangling a predictive score generated from big
data is more complex. Ironically, tests like the SATs were initially created
to provide “neutral” metrics of merit in order to expand educational
opportunities to a broader range of students,246 yet the reality is that test
results reflect the disadvantages of test takers.247 The use of big data is
likely to mirror this trajectory. Lower income young adults are avid social
media users, but less likely than their higher income peers to use privacy
settings to limit the information they share online.248 Will SAT scores and

243. See Daniel Kiel, No Caste Here? Toward a Structural Critique of American Education, 119
PENN. ST. L. REV. 611, 631 (2015).
244. See Kim, supra note 106, at 51.
245. Jules Polonetsky & Omer Tene, Who is Reading Whom Now: Privacy in Education from
Books to MOOCs, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 927, 962 (2015).
246. West-Faulcon, supra note 236, at 1113–14.
247. See Dimitrios Halikias & Richard V. Reeves, Race Gaps in SAT Scores Highlight Inequality
and Hinder Upward Mobility, BROOKINGS (Feb. 1, 2017), https://perma.cc/X6XK-AHMZ.
248. Results from the main survey discussed in this paper indicate that, among young adult
Internet users ages eighteen to twenty-nine living in households earning less than $40,000 per year,
73% have used privacy settings to limit who can see what they post online. By comparison, fully 85%
of young adult Internet users living in households earning $40,000 or more per year said they use
privacy settings. Mary Madden, Privacy, Security and Digital Inequality: How Technology
Experiences and Resources Vary Based on Socioeconomic Status and Race, DATA & SOC’Y
RESEARCH INST. (forthcoming 2017). They also receive less education about privacy settings from
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criminal background checks be replaced by social media and data broker
proxies?
It is possible that a student could uncover the variables that influenced
his or her admissions decision using FERPA,249 which protects the
confidentiality of student educational records. Schools that violate FERPA
risk a loss of federal funding, although this penalty has never been
imposed.250 Under FERPA, students have the right to review educational
records, request corrections, receive a hearing if the correction is denied,
prohibit the release of personally identifiable information, and receive an
annual notice of FERPA rights.251 However, even if a student gained
access to their file, he or she would be hard-pressed to identify an
underlying algorithmic variable or how it impacted the school’s decision.
As with many digital records, there are concerns that the information
feeding predictive analytics is not always accurate. The law provides little
recourse. FCRA does not apply to admissions processes at educational
institutions.252 Moreover, many colleges gather student data through
student self-reporting or by searching for information themselves,253 thus
taking them outside FCRA’s regulation of credit reporting. If colleges
were subject to FCRA with regard to prospective students, they would
have to notify applicants about a background check and obtain their
consent, as well as notify a student before rejecting them if the decision
were based in part on the report, and provide the student with the
opportunity to challenge the accuracy of the report.254 Such changes would
be a positive step for ensuring fairness in higher education admissions, but
could face many of the limitations of FCRA in the consumer context.
One trend in higher education that is on the FTC’s radar is the practice
of “lead generation,” which may prey upon low-income students—
particularly those whose social media activity is readily accessible. As the
FTC defines it, lead generation “is the practice of identifying or cultivating

teachers and parents than their wealthier peers. See Koenig & Rustad, supra note 209, at 611–12.
249. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 99.1.
250. See Polonetsky & Tene, supra note 245, at 967.
251. 20 U.S.C.S. § 1232g(a). Parents hold these rights for their children until they are eighteen or
enroll in college, at which time they transfer to the student. Id. Polontesky & Tene point out that
privacy of student records may have the cost of keeping important data about structural disadvantage
out of the hands of civil rights organizations and educational reformers. Polonetsky & Tene, supra
note 245, at 969.
252. See Darby Dickerson, Background Checks in the University Admissions Process: An
Overview of Legal and Policy Considerations, 34 J.C. & U.L. 419, 460 (2008).
253. See supra notes 219 and 224 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 135–138 and accompanying text.
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consumer interest in a product or service, and distributing this information
to third parties.”255 The FTC notes that such leads often contain sensitive
personal and financial information “that may travel through multiple
online marketing entities before connecting with the desired business.”256
In the higher education sphere, there are websites that gather information
about potential students and then sell the data to for-profit colleges, where
students often assume crippling debt with few job prospects after
graduation.257 The for-profit educational industry, in particular, targets
low-income students.258 In April 2016, the FTC announced a settlement of
its first enforcement action against a lead generator in the educational
sphere.259 The FTC alleged that Gigats.com had deceived consumers into
thinking they were being pre-screened for jobs when it was instead
gathering information for for-profit educational schools that were paying
for the leads.260 While transparent and truthful lead generation has the
potential to connect low-income students to educational opportunities,
continued FTC enforcement in this area will be important to protect
students from deceptive practices. At the same time, lead generation seems
to be only the tip of the iceberg in terms of potential big data disparities in
the field of higher education.
C. Policing
1. The Emerging World of Threat Scores and Predictive Policing Tools
Due to historic patterns in law enforcement, the problems that
algorithmic decision-making (drawing on social media and Internet use)
poses for the poor are especially acute when considering the potential
consequences of “threat scoring” systems and other predictive policing
tools. As noted in the May 2014 White House Report Big Data: Seizing
Opportunities, Preserving Values, one of the more controversial features

255. Follow the Lead: An FTC Workshop on Lead Generation, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Oct. 30,
2015), https://perma.cc/7WP3-CZTJ.
256. Id.
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AND ONLINE LEAD GENERATION: PRIVATE UNIVERSITIES USE DIGITAL MARKETING TO TARGET
PROSPECTS, INCLUDING VETERANS, VIA THE INTERNET (2015), https://perma.cc/38U4-CPN5.
258. See Alia Wong, The Downfall of For-Profit Colleges, ATLANTIC (Feb. 23, 2015), https://
perma.cc/7N5A-JGX5.
259. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Charges Education Lead Generator with Tricking
Job Seekers by Claiming to Represent Hiring Employers (Apr. 28, 2016), https://perma.cc/3UVSPK8D.
260. Id.
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of new predictive policing tools is the ability to create individualized
scores to assess a single person’s propensity for being involved in a
crime.261 While the formulas behind proprietary analytical models are
currently inaccessible to researchers or even the police departments who
purchase these tools, some insights can be gleaned through analysis of
marketing materials associated with some of the platforms being sold for
use in law enforcement across the United States.
In a recent review of promotional materials and public statements
associated with Beware, one of the controversial threat scoring tools being
piloted in places such as Fresno, California, David Robinson noted that,
“threat scores may reflect everything from criminal histories to social
media activity to health-related history.”262 Rather than relying on police
department or city records, the assessments are based on data gathered
from commercial data brokers.263 However, it is entirely unclear—both to
police departments and the general public—how individual variables
being fed into these models might be weighted and what kind of threat
they are actually measuring.264 Those who are subject to these analyses
(which are run in response to a 911 call) are given neither any insight into
how the data is being used, nor any ability to correct errors in cases where
inaccurate information may result in a mistaken assessment of the
individual.265
With many different data streams feeding into these models, there are
myriad opportunities for problems associated with information quality and
accuracy. As one widely reported anecdote noted, when Fresno, California
councilman Clinton J. Olivier asked to have his threat score run by the
Beware system at a local hearing last November, the tool returned a threat
level of “yellow” for his address (rather than “green,” as one might expect
of a public official)—possibly due to the activities of someone who
previously lived at his address.266

261. SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 57, at 31.
262. David Robinson, Buyer Beware: A Hard Look at Police ‘Threat Scores,’ EQUAL FUTURE
(Jan. 14, 2016), https://perma.cc/4MSE-JVXN.
263. Id.
264. This lack of transparency was highlighted as a major concern by the ACLU last year, who,
along with a coalition of civil rights groups and technology companies, published a joint statement to
express their shared concerns about predictive policing tools. See THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON
CIVIL & HUMAN RIGHTS ET AL., PREDICTIVE POLICING TODAY: A SHARED STATEMENT OF CIVIL
RIGHTS CONCERNS (2016), https://perma.cc/8UPU-J783.
265. ALEXANDRA MATEESCU ET AL., DATA & SOC’Y RESEARCH INST., SOCIAL MEDIA
SURVEILLANCE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT (2015), https://perma.cc/S4Z7-634X.
266. Justin Jouvenal, The New Way Police Are Surveilling You: Calculating Your Threat ‘Score,’
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Problems with information quality that can lead law enforcement to
make inaccurate assumptions about the risks associated with a given
address are not unique to big data analytics, but can be exacerbated by the
transient nature of low-income communities. A recent Washington Post
article relayed the story of a 63-year-old grandmother, Sallie Taylor,
whose home was wrongfully raided by D.C. police one evening in January
2015. After bursting through her door, pointing a shotgun at her face and
pushing her to the floor, the officers searched through her belongings for
thirty minutes and ultimately left empty-handed. Police later discovered
that, due to outdated information in the court records system, they had
used the wrong address for the suspect they had been searching to find.267
Similar scenarios occurred eleven more times in Washington, D.C. over a
two-year period.268
While threat scoring generally targets a specific residence or person,
other predictive policing tools offer a broader portrait of potential crime
“hot spot” locations that are intended to help police better allocate their
attention and resources.269 Early versions of these systems required a
police investigator’s input into the weighting of the variables and
decisions about how they would be factored into the model, but newer
systems increasingly rely on machine learning and “[don’t] require a
human to figure out what variables matter and how much.”270
One such example is the Hitachi Visualization Predictive Crime
Analytics tool, which “gobbles massive amounts of data—from public
transit maps, social media conversations, weather reports, and more—and
uses machine learning to find patterns that humans can’t pick out.”271 In
particular, the role of social media input has been described as an
especially important component of the tool, increasing its predictive
accuracy by 15%.272

WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2016), https://perma.cc/GQH4-BXJV.
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Location data gleaned from social media posts can be especially
valuable in big data-driven policing tools. As Mateescu et al. note in their
discussion of social media surveillance tools currently being used by law
enforcement,
Companies like Geofeedia offer products that use the location data
of social media posts, when available, and map them. Using these
maps, clients are able to specify a delimited geographic area and
view all geotagged posts coming from that location in near realtime. Use of geotagging features to map social media activity has
been touted as a crucial tool in assisting first responders in
emergencies, as well as surveilling areas of concentrated activity,
such as concerts or public protests. 273
However, the availability of social media as a viable input depends on
both a high level of usage among the communities under surveillance and
the use of public platforms or public settings to make the communications
broadly accessible to law enforcement. While police departments routinely
request social media data from specific accounts as part of ongoing
investigations, they are generally not able to monitor the complete firehose
of social media data (both public and private) in real-time. Typically,
social media monitoring systems rely on public social media data streams
and this allows them to avoid what is seen as a “legal gray area” around
content not intended for public consumption.274 Given the aforementioned
propensity of lower-income social media users to post content publicly
and their tendency to rely on mobile devices that may be more vulnerable
to law enforcement surveillance, the effective impact of this monitoring is
not likely to be evenly distributed.
NC4, which produces the NC4 Signal tool to provide social media
monitoring for law enforcement, is also designed to “listen” to public
communications across popular social media platforms, such as Twitter
and Facebook. The resulting cache of data gathered through the system
includes text, images, and video that can be filtered and visualized to
enhance “operational decision-making to ensure optimum results.”275 A
blog post on the company’s website lists the “pros and cons” of social
media monitoring and touts the operational benefits of the method, but

273. Mateescu, supra note 265, at 4 (footnotes omitted).
274. See, e.g., A Look at the Pros and Cons of Social Media Monitoring in Law Enforcement,
NC4, https://perma.cc/P72X-DWGY.
275. Leveraging Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) for Public Safety, NC4, https://perma.cc/
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concedes that it can raise some privacy and perception-related concerns:
“there aren't any true operational drawbacks to using social media
monitoring software, but it can create problems with reputation and
perception in the community, as well as with privacy advocates.”276 One
such problem is the risk of misinterpretation; when social media posts are
analyzed outside of the original context in which they were shared, jokes,
memes, sarcasm, and irony are not taken into account. In addition,
individuals may be assessed not only by what they choose to post, but also
by the content that their friends or followers post in association with their
profile. These problems can be heightened when determinations are made
largely by algorithms and automated systems, which can exacerbate
entrenched biases. As Mateescu et al. argue, the removal of human
judgment in the assessment of risk creates the potential for more
widespread systematic bias.
Absent careful review, machine learning techniques applied to social
media could easily reinforce existing patterns of enforcement, which partly
reflect a disproportionate focus on people of color. To the extent that they
replace human discretion, these automated systems may be trading
individual bias–malicious or otherwise–for a new, systematic bias.277
2. Legal Analysis of Predictive Policing
Existing law fails to protect citizens from the potential dangers of
predictive policing. Simply put, “[t]he rise of big data technologies offers
a challenge to the traditional paradigm of Fourth Amendment law.”278 The
Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unreasonable government
searches and seizures.279 The Supreme Court has long ruled that the Fourth
Amendment protects only objectively reasonable expectations of privacy.
In Katz v. United States, the Court held that a defendant had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in a phone booth.280 Once outside the proverbial
phone booth, a citizen loses this protection. Thus, there is no Fourth
Amendment protection for information people share in public or to third

276. See supra note 274.
277. Mateescu, supra note 265, at 7.
278. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L.
REV. 327, 329 (2015).
279. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
280. 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967).
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parties,281 such as “data given to commercial third parties, including
banking records, telephone call lists, cell phone locations, or Internet
search or subscriber information.” 282
Scholars have argued that this doctrine “should not hold its traditional
force once the police deploy the tools of big data,”283 and the Supreme
Court has signaled that the law will need to adapt to emerging
technologies. In United States v. Jones, the Court held that police
placement of a GPS device on a suspect’s car without a warrant violated
the Fourth Amendment because it was a physical intrusion that violated
the defendant’s right to privacy.284 In this narrow ruling, the Court did not
endorse the mosaic theory, which the appellate court below had applied.285
The mosaic theory provides that prolonged surveillance generates
individual pieces of information that constitute a Fourth Amendment
search when aggregated.286 In other words, the “whole reveals far more
than the individual movements it comprises.”287 While the Supreme Court
majority did not adopt this theory, five Justices intimated they are poised
to reconsider the notion of reasonable expectations in our digital age. As
Justice Sotomayor stated in concurrence, “I would ask whether people
reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in
a manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will,
their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”288 At this
time, however, the third-party doctrine prevails.
Statutes are no bulwark against predictive policing given that existing
legal protections for health and financial information typically yield to law
enforcement needs.289 Moreover, if government obtains its information
from a private data broker such as Beware, even the existing minimal
statutory requirements for legal process can be evaded.290 And of course,
the Constitution does not constrain the behavior of private data brokers,
only government actors.

281. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“The depositor takes the risk, in revealing
his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the Government.”).
282. See Ferguson, supra note 278, at 373–74 (footnotes omitted); see also Elizabeth E. Joh,
Policing by Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth Amendment, 89 WASH. L. REV. 35, 59 (2014).
283. Joh, supra note 282, at 62 (footnote omitted).
284. 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012).
285. See id.; United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
286. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562.
287. Id.
288. Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
289. See Ferguson, supra note 278, at 374.
290. Id. at 360, 379.

110

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 95:053

Once the police have data in their possession, the issue becomes how
they can use it. Police may initially want to use predictive analysis to
conduct surveillance of “persons suspected of ongoing or future criminal
activity.”291 This surveillance phase of policing, undertaken prior to a
search, detention, or arrest, is not a Fourth Amendment event, and it thus
does not require individualized suspicion.292 As Elizabeth Joh has
explained, police have the unfettered discretion to single out certain people
for investigation based on predictive tools.293 Surveillance could
potentially bump up against other constitutional rights, but relief through
these avenues is unlikely. Claims that discretionary surveillance violates
First Amendment rights of association, such as with police surveillance of
a group engaging in political activity, often falter on standing grounds.294
Following surveillance, police may want to stop, question, search, or
seize a suspect. These phases of police activity require individualized
suspicion. For a stop and frisk, the police must have a reasonable
suspicion, and for a more sustained search or an arrest, police must have
probable cause (and sometimes a warrant). Courts look at a totality of the
circumstances to determine whether these standards of individualized
suspicion have been met.295 Traditionally, police developed reasonable
suspicion through observing activities in the real world and gathering
information from sources. The process was retrospective and
particularized, whereas predictive policing is generalized and
prospective.296
As Andrew Ferguson explains, the use of big data in predictive
policing “has the potential to change the reasonable suspicion calculus
because more personal or predictive information about a suspect will make
it easier for police to justify stopping a suspect.”297 Big data not only adds
factors to the totality of circumstances test, but it can also be particularized
to a specific subject, as courts demand.298 Yet increased granularity in data

291. See Elizabeth E. Joh, The New Surveillance Discretion: Automated Suspicion, Big Data, and
Policing, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y. REV. 15, 18 (2016).
292. Id. at 17.
293. Id. at 34.
294. Id. at 35.
295. See Ferguson, supra note 278, at 339.
296. See Fabio Arcila, Jr., Nuance, Technology, and the Fourth Amendment: A Response to
Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion, 63 EMORY L.J. ONLINE, 2087, 2090 (2014).
297. Ferguson, supra note 278, at 351. See also Arcila, supra note 296, at 2090; Joh, supra note
282, at 28.
298. Ferguson, supra note 278, at 387. See also Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data
Policing, GA. L. REV. 38 (forthcoming 2017) (“[I]f a model is individualized enough, it satisfies the
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can increase the risks of disparate impact due to inadequacies and
inaccuracies in data.299 Ferguson thus argues that courts should require a
direct link between predictive data about a suspect and police suspicion
arising from direct observation.300 Whether courts will heed this advice
remains to be seen.
Equal Protection claims based on discriminatory police enforcement
resulting from big data would also likely fail.301 Predictive analytics might
embed stereotyped views of suspects, but it does so unintentionally.302 The
Court has held that discriminatory intent is required to prevail under the
Equal Protection Clause.303 Indeed, even old-fashioned exercises of police
discretion that result in disparate impacts on minorities are nearly
impossible to challenge under equal protection.304
Another concern regarding predictive analytics is the large number of
mistakes within the data.305 In fact, the FBI’s files, which are regularly
used for background checks, are known to contain hundreds of thousands
of mistakes.306 In addition, programmers can make mistakes in creating the
software and algorithms that analyze the data.307 However, there are no
meaningful quality controls on shared data and no individual rights to
learn about or correct mistakes.308 As a constitutional matter, the Supreme
Court holds that exclusion of evidence from trial that was based on
erroneous evidence in government databases is required only in cases of
gross negligence or systemic misconduct.309 Meeting this standard is
nearly impossible given the difficulty of isolating erroneous material from

Fourth Amendment.”).
299. Selbst, supra note 298, at 39–40.
300. Ferguson, supra note 278, at 388.
301. See Selbst, supra note 298, at 5, 29.
302. Id. at 29.
303. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). For a prominent critique, see Charles R.
Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN.
L. REV. 317 (1987).
304. See Paul Butler, The White Fourth Amendment, 32 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 245, 246 (2010);
Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of the Land: United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO,
L.J. 1005, 1006 (2010) (“[R]acial profiling by law enforcement authorities in the United States has
long been permitted and encouraged, if not expressly authorized, by U.S. constitutional law.”).
305. Ferguson, supra note 278, at 398.
306. Id. at 399.
307. See Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the Fourth
Amendment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 871, 925 (2016).
308. Ferguson, supra note 278, at 398–99.
309. See Rich, supra note 307, at 925–27 (citing Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1995);
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 146 (2009)).

112

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 95:053

the reams of data involved, as well as the proprietary nature of and secrecy
underlying the databases.310 In short, whether big data is accurate or errorfilled, current law provides scant constraint on its use in the criminal
justice system.
Predictive policing’s use of social media information gleaned from online networks also raises the specter of guilt by association, which is
disfavored in our justice system. As the Supreme Court has stated, guilt by
association is “alien to the traditions of a free society.”311 At the same
time, “it is beyond debate” that the right of free association “for the
advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of . . .
`liberty.’”312 However, the right of free association, as currently conceived,
is largely focused on protecting the ability of formally constituted groups
to function without government interference.313 For instance, foundational
Supreme Court cases protected the NAACP from having to turn over its
membership lists to the government.314 By contrast, many social media
relationships are between loose networks of friends and acquaintances and
do not fit this paradigm.315 Furthermore, free association doctrine protects
communications that are either expressive (meaning political in nature) or
intimate (such as within families), 316 but not social ones that constitute the
bulk of web-based chatter.317 In addition, algorithms scoop in metadata
and other non-content data, which are not words and thus do not have an
associative dimension as understood in traditional doctrine.318 For all these
reasons, free association doctrine will need considerable revamping to
protect against guilt by on-line association.319

310. Id. at 928.
311. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 932 (1982).
312. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
313. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 648, 655–56 (2000).
314. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 466.
315. Peter Swire writes about the tension between protecting individual privacy (which calls for
data protection) and encouraging online political activity (which calls for data empowerment). Peter
Swire, Social Networks, Privacy, and Freedom of Association: Data Protection vs. Data
Empowerment, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1371, 1376–77 (2012). This is a different issue than guilt by algorithm
in that the communications Swire is concerned with are political in purpose and generally not leading
to punitive measures. Id. at 1377–80.
316. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984); John D. Inazu, Virtual Assembly, 98
CORNELL L. REV. 1093, 1099–1100 (2013).
317. See Inazu, supra note 316, at 1119; Deven R. Desai, Constitutional Limits on Surveillance:
Associational Freedom in the Age of Data Hoarding, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579, 593–94 (2014).
318. See Desai, supra note 317, at 589; Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a
Networked World: First Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 741, 747
(2008).
319. For scholars attempting to expand freedom of association to cover on-line communications,
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IV. SUGGESTED REMEDIES AND THEIR EFFICACY FOR LOW-INCOME
POPULATIONS
Current legal frameworks offer little protection or recourse for privacyrelated harms experienced by the poor. At present, privacy law in the
United States is fragmented and sectoral.320 Unlike most other developed
nations, the United States does not have a single data protection law.321
Instead, we have industry-specific statutory protections, such as laws that
govern the health or financial services industries.322 Outside of these
narrow statutes, the United States relies primarily on self-regulation by the
entities that gather and maintain personal data and puts the onus on
individuals to police their own data disclosures.323 Given the gaps in
United States privacy law, a diverse group of scholars, policymakers, and
practitioners have made numerous recommendations to enhance personal
data privacy. Due to the scope and scale of the many detailed and granular
proposals, this Part neither parses nor endorses them. Rather, this Part
assesses how some of the most prominent approaches might impact lowincome people and suggests possible improvements to the current privacy
landscape. The political system is less responsive to low-income than
wealthy Americans324 and low-income Americans have less access to the

see, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, Membership Lists, Metadata, and Freedom of Association’s
Specificity Requirement, 10 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 327 (2014); Desai, supra note 317;
Chris J. Chasin, The Revolution Will Be Tweeted, But the Tweets Will Be Subpoenaed: Reimagining
Fourth Amendment Privacy to Protect Associational Anonymity, 2014 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1
(2014); Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Friends, Associates, and Associations: Theoretically and Empirically
Grounding the Freedom of Association, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 53 (2014).
320. See Solove & Hartzog, The New Common Law, supra note 142, at 587.
321. Although this Article focuses on federal law due to its national scope, it is important to
recognize that state laws also govern online privacy and big data collection. Partly due to
congressional intransience, some state legislators and attorneys general have been particularly
energetic in protecting and enforcing consumer privacy interests. See Danielle Keats Citron, The
Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747 (2016); Ganka
Hadjipetrova & Hannah G. Poteat, States are Coming to the Fore of Privacy in the Digital Era, 6
LANDSLIDE 1, 12 (July/Aug. 2014); Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902,
917–18 (2009). For a list of relevant laws, see State Laws Related to Internet Privacy, NAT’L CONF.
STATE LEGIS. (Jan. 5, 2016), https://perma.cc/FEE3-88VQ.
322. See BJ Ard, The Limits of Industry-Specific Privacy Law, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 607, 607 (2015)
(“[T]he distinct features of online commerce . . . challenge discrete industry-specific laws.”).
323. See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L.
REV. 1880, 1880–81 (2013).
324. See MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL
POWER IN AMERICA 70–123 (2012). Gilens’ research finds “a fairly strong association between policy
outcomes and the preferences of the affluent, and weaker associations for the preferences of the middle
class and the poor.” Id. at 5.
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justice system.325 As a result, their voices are often silenced, despite their
heightened vulnerability to privacy intrusions. Thus, our goal is to
emphasize the privacy concerns facing low-income Americans in current
policy discussions.
A. Notice and Choice
In the absence of broad statutory protections for big data, the FTC and
the Obama Administration pushed self-regulation by business, largely
through notice and choice offered to consumers.326 This has been and
remains the current governing privacy paradigm in the United States.327
The goal of notice and choice is to provide consumers with information
about a website’s privacy policy, including its collection, use, and sharing
practices, in order to allow the consumer to decide whether or not to use a
certain website.328 This model promotes the important value of selfautonomy, but assumes a fair contractual bargain between the website and
the consumer, which is a myth for several reasons. Moreover, the
assumptions underlying notice-and-choice are likely even more attenuated
for under-resourced people.
To begin with, studies show that consumers do not understand website
privacy notices because they are purposefully complex, lengthy, and
jargon filled.329 This can be particularly pernicious for less educated

325. See generally LEGAL SERVS. CORP., THE JUSTICE GAP: MEASURING THE UNMET CIVIL
LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 6 (2017), http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/images/
TheJusticeGap-FullReport.pdf.
326. See Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Privacy Harms and the Effectiveness of the Notice and Choice
Framework, 11 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y. FOR INFO. SOC’Y, 485, 486–87 (2015); Hoofnagle & Urban, supra
note 10, at 1; Solove & Harztog, The New Common Law, supra note 142, at 592. For a recent
description and endorsement of notice and choice, see FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC ISSUES FINAL
COMMISSION REPORT ON PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY: AGENCY CALLS ON COMPANIES TO
ADOPT BEST PRIVACY PRACTICES (2012), https://perma.cc/7PM6-ZV6K.
327. See Solove, supra note 323, at 1880–81 (describing structural and cognitive barriers to
privacy self-management regimes). There are some indications that the FTC under the Trump
Administration might narrow consumer protections by recognizing only privacy violations that result
in harm, rather than a broader approach that gives consumers the right to opt out of sharing personal
data with businesses regardless of whether or not harm would result from disclosure. See James R.
Hood, FTC’s New Head Eyes “Harms-Based Approach” to Privacy Protection, CONSUMER AFF.
(Feb. 8, 2017), https://perma.cc/BJE9-MNRR.
328. See Robert H. Sloan & Richard Warner, Beyond Notice and Choice: Privacy, Norms, and
Consent, 24 J. HIGH TECH. L. 370, 374 (2014).
329. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 326, at 491; Robert Sprague & Corey Ciocchetti,
Preserving Identities: Protecting Personal Identifying Information Through Enhanced Privacy
Policies and Laws, 19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 91, 122–23 (2009); Sloan & Warner, supra note 328, at
391; Jan Whittington & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Unpacking Privacy’s Price, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1327,
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consumers, who are also more likely to be low-income.330 Indeed, recent
surveys have supported earlier research indicating that adults with lower
levels of education are more likely to falsely assume that when a company
posts a privacy policy, it ensures the company will keep all of the
information it collects on users confidential.331 Even the most diligent
consumer would lack the time to read the hundreds of privacy policies he
or she might encounter in a single day.332 And that time might be wasted
given that companies often reserve the right to change their policies in the
future without additional notice and consent, thus upsetting any initial
bargain struck by a consumer.333 Complicated privacy policies and
complex privacy settings may be by design—if websites and social media
applications require individuals to share information to make money, it
may be in their best interest to keep individuals in the dark about their use
of personal data. Moreover, even when a privacy policy is clear and
comprehensible, consumers have no way to control how their data might
be used downstream by third parties or later aggregated into a larger
portfolio of information about them.334 Moreover, a person who opts out of
a certain website may not be aware that another person’s disclosure
implicates them in ways of interest to data miners.335

1357–58 (2012); Mark A. Graber, Donna M. D’Alessandro & Jill Johnson-West, Reading Level of
Privacy Policies on Internet Health Web Sites, 51 J. FAM. PRAC. 642, 642 (2002).
330. Notice and choice is no barrier to discrimination, “[i]nstead, giving individuals notice and
choice may simply perpetuate the growing gap between consumer ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ because the
least sophisticated consumers remain least likely to protect themselves.” Schmitz, supra note 139, at
1462–63. See Koenig & Rustad, supra note 209, at 616, 620, 627 (describing the lower levels of
reading comprehension of low-income persons and how this renders privacy notices useless).
331. See Aaron Smith, What Internet Users Know About Technology and the Web, PEW RES. CTR.
(Nov. 25, 2014), https://perma.cc/8M7R-ETSX.
332. See Reidenberg, supra note 326, at 492. Aleecia McDonald and Lorrie Cranor calculated that
if all Americans were to read their privacy policies, the opportunity cost would be $781 billion.
Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, I/S: J.L. & POL’Y
FOR INFO. SOC’Y 544, 561 (2008).
333. See Sprague & Ciochetti, supra note 329, at 126; danah boyd & Eszter Hargittai, Facebook
Privacy Settings: Who Cares?, 15 FIRST MONDAY 1, 2 (2010), https://perma.cc/SQG3-W7SY; Paul
Ohm, Branding Privacy, 97 MINN. L. REV. 907, 909 (2013) (describing how such privacy lurches (or
changes in promised policies) “disrupt long-settled expectations” and proposing that privacy policies
become part of a company’s brand that can only be changed with a new name).
334. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 326, at 492; Schmitz, supra note 139, at 1425; Natalie
Kim, Three’s a Crowd: Towards Contextual Integrity in Third-Party Data Sharing, 28 HARV. J. L. &
TECH. 325, 327 (2014) (“privacy policies essentially remain a blunt instrument, giving users a binary
option between sharing with none or sharing with all . . . .”); Clark D. Asay, Consumer Information
Privacy and the Problem(s) of Third-Party Disclosures, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 321, 324
(2013).
335. Reidenberg et al., supra note 326, at 495
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Furthermore, notice and choice regimes are no guarantee of privacy.
Numerous companies have failed to adhere to their stated privacy policies,
failed to keep data secure, and retained data longer than what users deem
as reasonable.336 For all these reasons, self-regulation appears inadequate
alone to protect consumer privacy interests. A major report in 2011
concluded that companies create self-regulation regimes and rules in
secret, lack consumer representatives, only involve a fraction of covered
industries, survive for only short periods, are underfunded, and lack the
ability to enforce rules or maintain members.337 Often, companies are
unwilling to self-regulate along even the most basic privacy-protective
principles.338 Accordingly, scholars have argued that self-regulation can at
times function as a charade providing cover to industry in lieu of
substantive regulation.339
In addition, notice and choice simply cannot protect against certain
harms, such as failure to adhere to the terms of a notice, negligent security
practices, or wrongful retention of personal data.340 In other words, notice
and choice does not protect against broken promises. Other legal
protections are required to enforce any bargain struck by consumers.
Even where legal protections exist, such as with FCRA, we need to be
mindful of the limits of private litigation when it comes to low-income
individuals. Most low-income consumers will never know that they have
been subject to adverse action based on personally identifiable
information. Even if they become aware of a privacy violation, they lack
the resources to hire a lawyer, and civil legal services satisfy only 14% of
the legal needs of low-income litigants.341 Statutory damages for privacy
violations under FCRA are low.342 Many agreements that bind consumers

336.
337.

Id. at 521–23.
ROBERT GELLMAN & PAM DIXON, WORLD PRIVACY FORUM, MANY FAILURES: A BRIEF
HISTORY OF SELF-REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (2011), https://perma.cc/WE6R-SDGV.
338. See Natasha Singer, Consumer Groups Back Out of Federal Talks on Face Recognition,
N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (June 16, 2015, 12:10 AM), https://perma.cc/VR6C-GQD2.
339. See Chris Hoofnagle, Can Privacy Self-Regulation Work for Consumers?, TAP BLOG (Jan.
26, 2011), https://perma.cc/2KS7-7NPL.
340. Reidenberg, et al., supra note 326, at 521. In addition, notice and choice is nearly impossible
with regard to the Internet of things, which is increasingly capturing personally identifiable
information. See Meg Leta Jones, Privacy Without Screens & The Internet of Other People’s Things,
51 IDAHO L. REV. 639, 640 (2015).
341. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, supra note 325, at 6.
342. See Austin H. Krist, Note, Large-Scale Enforcement of the Fair Credit Reporting Act and the
Role of State Attorneys General, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2311, 2321–22 (2015). Under FCRA, potential
compensatory damages for an individual plaintiff are low. A violation results in a maximum award of
$1000, and then only for willful noncompliance, which is hard to prove and which courts rarely find.
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push them into arbitration, rather than court, and arbitration is typically a
process too expensive for an individual to pursue. In short, there is almost
no incentive or ability for a private consumer to bring a data privacy claim.
For all these reasons, notice and choice—even an improved version of
notice and choice—is not sufficient on its own to protect consumer
privacy, and it is particularly problematic for low-income Americans.
B. Digital Literacy
Given the well-known shortcomings in notice and choice regimes,
some advocates have argued for greater digital literacy so that people can
better avail themselves of notice and choice protections. Digital literacy
refers to the vast array of “technical, cognitive, and sociological skills”
that individuals need “in order to perform tasks and solve problems in
digital environments.”343 The term suffers from a lack of precision, and is
used to refer to: assessing information credibility, mastery of certain
technical skills, knowledge of computer hardware and peripherals,
familiarity with software interfaces, social-emotional awareness of digital
environments, and so forth.344 Digital literacy programs in which
individuals are taught some of these skills, are often championed as
potential solutions for privacy violations, particularly when those
violations could have been prevented by self-help behaviors by
individuals. Some programs explicitly teach privacy practices and
behaviors, such as how to change privacy settings on social media, while
others generally discourage people from sharing online. Some researchers
postulate that digital literacy programs that improve people’s Internet
skills may “support, encourage, and empower users to undertake informed
control of their digital identities.”345
One possible interpretation of the results presented in Part II of this
paper is that privacy education, or increased privacy literacy, may help
solve the problems of low-income Internet users. Our empirical data
suggests that when compared to higher-earning people, low-income users
are less confident in their ability to manage their privacy settings,

15 U.S.C. §1681n (2012).
343. Yoram Eshet-Alkalai, Digital Literacy: A Conceptual Framework for Survival Skills in the
Digital Era, 13 J. EDUC. MULTIMEDIA & HYPERMEDIA 93 (2004).
344. Yoram Eshet Alkali & Yair Amichai-Hamburger, Experiments in Digital Literacy, 7
CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAV. 421 (2004); DIGITAL LITERACIES: CONCEPTS, POLICIES AND
PRACTICES (Colin Lankshear, Michele Knobel & Michael Peters eds., 2008).
345. Yong Jin Park, Digital Literacy and Privacy Behavior Online, 40 COMM. RES. 215, 217
(2013).
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understand privacy policies, and find tools and strategies that would help
them protect their personal information online. While privacy literacy may
help people to feel more effective at managing their information, and may
reduce some of their exposure to data collection, it is not a sufficient
solution to the problems that the poor face with regards to privacy and
information flow.
First, as noted above,346 most users find privacy settings and privacy
policies abstruse and difficult to understand. Second, harms related to data
collection and dissemination are institutional problems that cannot be fully
ameliorated through individual use of extant privacy tools, even if datarelated vulnerabilities of the poor are exacerbated by lack of privacyprotective behaviors (e.g., adjusting privacy settings). Even if individuals
chose to abstain from social media entirely, their personal information
would still be collected from a myriad of sources including, but not limited
to government, public, and court records; motor vehicle and driving
records; recorded mortgages and tax assessments; catalog and magazine
subscriptions; store loyalty cards; warranties; the US Census; voter
registration information; financial records; and others.347 Simply moving
through a city, using public transportation, or driving on toll roads creates
a data trail that is almost impossible to avoid.348 Putting the burden on
individuals alone to protect their privacy ignores the multitude of ways in
which information is collected, tracked, and aggregated in ways that
individuals cannot control, and of which they may not be aware.
Most importantly, emphasizing privacy literacy in the absence of other
possible reforms shifts the responsibility for privacy protection to the
individual. This suggests that if an individual’s privacy is violated, it is
because she did not protect it adequately. This places the fault on the
individual rather than the person or organization that violated her privacy.
This rhetoric of individual responsibility is also found in the public debate
over social services, in which poverty is seen as resulting from a series of
bad decisions made by individuals, rather than a systemic problem.349
This, in turn, justifies some of the wide-reaching privacy violations
detailed earlier in this document that contribute to the dehumanization of
the poor, such as welfare home visits, mandatory drug testing, and the like

346. See supra notes 329–335 and accompanying text.
347. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 57, at 11–15.
348. Kessler, supra note 69.
349. See Ronen Shamir, The Age of Responsibilization: On Market-Embedded Morality, 37
ECON. & SOC’Y 1 (2008); Martha Poon & Helaine Olen, Does Literacy Improve Finance?, 24 PUB.
UNDERSTANDING SCI. 272 (2015).
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in order to receive social services.350 While privacy literacy programs
provide an important foundation for improving consumer awareness of
privacy-enhancing tools and strategies, they do little to restrain the larger
ecosystem of data brokers, consumer profiling and government
surveillance discussed in this paper.
C. Due Process
Several scholars have argued that due process norms should apply to
big data applications, especially those that impact people’s access to
credit, employment, education and other life needs.351 Procedural due
process is enshrined in the Constitution and gives individuals the right to
notice and a hearing regarding governmental actions that threaten to take
away their life, liberty, or property.352 While due process rights only attach
to government actions, the quasi-governmental nature of how private
entities are determining public access to valuable opportunities makes the
values of due process—including “transparency, accuracy, accountability,
participation, and fairness”—appealing in a big data context.353 To enforce
these values, scholars have recommended that algorithmic formulas be
made public and that people who are adversely impacted have the right to
challenge inaccurate information about them or unfair outcomes.
As in the governmental context, “data due process” may be a limited
remedy for low-income individuals. To begin with, most people are not
aware of the extent to which their data are being gathered and aggregated
to make decisions about them.354 Recognizing this, advocates of this
approach suggest that every adverse decision against an individual be
revealed, along with an audit trail that reveals the basis of automated
decisions.355 When it comes to governmental benefits, a notice and
explanation of denial is fairly straightforward because these
determinations are usually made in the context of objective eligibility

350. See Gilman, Class Differential, supra note 1, at 1391–92; Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, A
Genealogy of Dependency: Tracing a Keyword of the U.S. Welfare State, 19 SIGNS 309 (1994); Jerry
Watts & Nan Marie Astone, Review: The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 by 104th Congress of the United States, 26 CONTEMP. SOC. 409 (1997).
351. See Crawford & Schultz, supra note 48; Citron & Pasquale, supra note 152.
352. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
353. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 152, at 19–20.
354. See Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Big Data Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393,
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criteria. However, such requirements would engender a radical reshaping
of the workplace, higher education, and related settings if every
disappointed applicant were entitled to a reason for their rejection along
with a dossier of algorithmic formulas that might have contributed to the
rejection, especially given that big data often interacts with individual
discretion in these situations.
Moreover, due process has proved a mixed revolution when it comes to
public benefits.356 While it has provided low-income people with a forum
to assert their rights, its shortcomings include a lack of lawyers to enforce
those rights, an adversarial rather than problem-solving approach, an often
demeaning and confusing process, and a masking of systemic injustice
through the framework of individual fair hearings. Thus, in the big data
context, it would be essential for any due process regime to ensure that
low-income people have a voice in designing systems for transparency and
accountability, that their interests are represented by enforcement entities,
and that enforcement involves systemic review of algorithmic processes
rather than reliance on individual complaints.
D. Comprehensive Consumer Privacy Legislation
The United States’ sectoral approach to privacy is often compared to
the European Union’s (EU) comprehensive, ex ante approach to
privacy.357 In the EU, data collection must be limited in scope and
retention, and data is subject to consumer consent, review, and
correction.358 Data subjects also have the right not to be subject to
decisions with legal effects generated from automated processing.359 In
2016, the EU passed the General Data Protection Regulation, which
provides even stronger privacy protections, including a “right to be

356. See
Jason
Parkin, Adaptable Due Process, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1309,
1331 (2012)
(summarizing critiques of fair hearing rights, including that “[f]air hearings do not address barriers that
prevent eligible individuals from applying for welfare in the first instance”); Rebecca E. Zietlow,
Giving Substance to Process: Countering the Due Process Counterrevolution, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 9,
26 (1997) (“formal procedural rights may hurt rather than help poor people because they serve to mask
substantive injustice”); Michael Herz, Parallel Universes: NEPA Lessons for the New Property, 93
COLUM. L. REV. 1668, 1710 (1993) (due process in public benefits regimes has “contributed to
routinization, alienation, and abuse”).
357. See generally James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus
Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151 (2004).
358. For a summary of EU data protections, see Marc Rotenberg & David Jacobs, Updating the
Law of Information Privacy: The New Framework of the European Union, 36 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 605, 615–622 (2013).
359. Id. at 619.
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forgotten,” strict consent requirements that place the burden of proof on
the collector, and increased sanctions for violations.360 The Regulation also
tightens restrictions on the processing of particularly sensitive information,
such as race, political opinions, and religion.361 In addition, the Regulation
gives people the right not to be subject to decisions solely based on
algorithms, including profiling, and to contest such decisions.362 Almost
all commentators acknowledge that the United States, with its emphasis on
personal liberty and corporate innovation, is very unlikely to adopt an
omnibus privacy statute in the style of the EU, with its emphasis on
personal dignity.363
Accordingly, a range of policymakers, business leaders, and privacy
advocates have argued for comprehensive privacy legislation in the more
limited sphere of online consumer activity.364 For instance, in 2012, the
Obama White House issued a proposed Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights
based on seven principles of individual control: transparency, respect for
context, security, access, accuracy, focused collection, and
accountability.365 This set of baseline protections would give consumers
the right to determine what data companies collect about them and how
those data are used, although it envisions a combination of industry self-

360. See Stephen Gardner, EU Parliament Finalizes Landmark Data Privacy Reg, BLOOMBERG
LAW (April 28, 2016), https://perma.cc/L6XT-K873. For detailed descriptions of the new regulation,
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Collision: A Turn to Institutions and Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1966, 1992–2003 (2013).
361. See Schwartz, Privacy Collision, supra note 360, at 1996. For a comparison of U.S. and EU
perspectives with regard to protections against discrimination, see generally Raymond Shih Ray Ku,
Data Privacy as a Civil Right: The EU Gets It?, 103 KY. L.J. 391 (2014–2015).
362. See Bryce Goodman & Seth Flaxman, European Union Regulations on Algorithmic
Decision-Making and a “Right to Explanation,” OXFORD INTERNET INST., https://arxiv.org/pdf/1606.
08813.pdf (describing Article 22 and the challenges and opportunities inherent in this new provision.).
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INTERNET POL’Y REV. (2016), https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/beyond-consent-improvingdata-protection-through-consumer-protection-law.
363. There is a debate over whether the federal government or the states are better sites for
privacy law. Compare Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, supra note 330, at 916-17 (arguing against
comprehensive federal regulation), with Patricia L. Bellia, Federalization in Information Privacy Law,
118 YALE L.J. 868 (2009) (arguing that Schwartz overstates the risks of omnibus federal regulation).
Several states are more protective of online personal data.
364. See Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, supra note 321, at 904 (describing calls for
comprehensive privacy legislation and arguing such an approach is misguided).
365. The White House, Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World: A Framework for
Protecting Privacy and Promoting Innovation in the Global Digital Economy, 4 J. PRIVACY &
CONFIDENTIALITY 95 (2012), https://perma.cc/8A4U-Y9SP.
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regulation and government enforcement.366 Relatedly, the FTC
recommended in 2014 that Congress enact legislation to regulate the data
broker industry so that consumers would know about the industry’s
activities and have access to information held about them by data
brokers.367 In recent years, Congress has considered, but failed to pass, a
variety of data privacy bills.
Almost any of these proposals would enhance data privacy while
providing companies with greater guidance as to their obligations. For
low-income consumers in particular, the effectiveness of these laws would
hinge upon the existence of meaningful sanctions, rigorous oversight by
governmental or third-party entities of data collection and processing,
clear notice and consent policies optimized for mobile devices, and a legal
commitment to identifying and ameliorating harmful and unjustified
disparate impacts.
E. Areas for Further Research
In light of these substantial challenges, there continues to be a great
need for interdisciplinary research to deepen our understanding of the class
differential in privacy vulnerability. This Article has sought to provide a
foundation for further inquiry, describing a matrix of overlapping
vulnerabilities that low-income communities face in the big data era. As
this analysis has illustrated, there are both considerable gaps in current
legal protections and the information available to the public to assess the
fairness of the rapidly evolving methods of automated decision-making in
employment, education, and law enforcement contexts. These gaps are
especially acute when considering the role of social media and networkbased assessments, the technical details of which are largely opaque and
ripe for further investigation by researchers.
Additional studies could further explore the connection between a
reliance on mobile access among low-income Internet users and increased
vulnerability to data broker profiling. Looking specifically at social media
exposure, deeper analyses of what kinds of content are made public by
default across different mobile versions of social media platforms would
build upon prior work examining changes in default sharing settings over

366. Id. at 104. Both companies and privacy advocates expressed complaints about the Consumer
Bill of Rights for going too far and not far enough respectively. See Brendan Sasso, Obama’s Privacy
Bill of Rights Gets Bashed from All Sides, ATLANTIC (Feb. 27, 2015), https://perma.cc/P9LG-R9GV.
367. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 57, at 49.
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time across popular social network sites.368 Future empirical studies could
also explore the public’s awareness of social media monitoring in these
environments and how this varies across socioeconomic groups.
Looking ahead, it is likely that data-driven innovation and its
associated economic efficiencies will continue to outpace the
implementation of legal constraints to prevent potentially biased or unfair
decision making practices for low-income communities. Ultimately, the
complexity of the current technological and legal environments will
increasingly require researchers and advocates to employ a range of
methods to ensure that the interests of those who are most vulnerable to
privacy-related harms are not overlooked or written off as necessary
collateral for realizing the benefits of the big data era.
CONCLUSION
We live in an age of increasing income and wealth inequality with an
economic gulf between the rich and poor and a stagnating middle-class.
Data-driven systems could play a role in reversing these trends by
expanding access to education, employment, and justice for marginalized
populations. However, they might conversely contribute to a widening of
that gap by providing a ready avenue to prey on the vulnerabilities of lowincome people, or to exclude them from opportunities due to biases
entrenched in algorithmic decision-making tools. Historically, poor people
have faced much greater surveillance than their wealthier counterparts, and
anti-poverty advocates are rightfully concerned that the digital world will
replicate, if not reinforce, both covert and overt patterns of surveillance.
For their part, low-income Americans express greater concerns regarding
data collection in a variety of contexts, but they are more likely to access
the Internet from less secure mobile devices, and to report lower usage of
privacy settings and protective strategies. The three case studies in this
Article highlight some forms of potentially harmful discrimination that
low-income Americans might face when data analytics are used in hiring,
college admissions, and law enforcement. In each setting, low-income
Americans face not only adverse inferences drawn based on their
personally identifiable information (which often is erroneous), but also
those drawn from their social media and demographic networks. Existing
law provides little recourse, as it mostly pre-dates the proliferation of the
Internet and favors business rather than consumer interests through a self-

368.

See supra note 96.
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regulatory regime. Given that the political system tends to be less
responsive to the needs of low-income Americans and that they often lack
access to the justice system, it is imperative that policy discussions around
digital privacy increasingly include the voices and perspectives of lowincome people.
APPENDIX: SUMMARY OF SURVEY METHODS
The survey on Privacy and Security Experiences of LowSocioeconomic Status Populations, sponsored by the Data & Society
Research Institute, obtained telephone interviews with a nationally
representative sample of 3000 adults ages eighteen and older living in the
United States. Interviews were completed in both English and Spanish,
according to the preference of the respondent. The survey was conducted
by Princeton Survey Research Associates International (PSRAI). The
interviews were administered by Princeton Data Source from November
18 to December 23, 2015. A combination of landline and cell phone
random-digit dial (RDD) samples was used to reach respondents
regardless of the types of telephone they have access to. Both samples
were disproportionately stratified to target low-income households. A total
of 1050 interviews were conducted with respondents on landline
telephones and 1950 interviews were conducted with respondents on
cellular phones, including 1193 who live in a household with no landline
telephone access.
Statistical results are weighted to correct for the disproportionate
sample design, the overlapping landline and cell sample frames and
disproportionate non-response across demographic groups that might bias
results. The final weighted total sample is representative of all adults ages
eighteen and older living in the United States. The margin of sampling
error for the complete set of weighted data is ±2.7 percentage points.
One inherent limitation of survey research is what is known as “social
desirability bias.” The Pew Research Center’s methodology experts
describe this as people’s “natural tendency to want to be accepted and
liked,” which may in turn lead people to report inaccurate answers to
questions that probe on sensitive subjects.369 In addition, it may be the case
that surveys underreport privacy concerns and sensitivities because those
who respond to surveys are generally more comfortable sharing
information about themselves. In terms of mode effects, however, recent

369.

See Questionnaire Design, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 2017), https://perma.cc/3VNR-MZFF .
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studies have suggested that there are not meaningful differences between
telephone and online surveys with respect to the degree people express
worries about computers and technology “being used to invade
privacy.”370

370. See From Telephone to the Web: The Challenge of Mode of Interview Effects in Public
Opinion Polls, PEW RES. CTR. (MAY 13, 2015), https://perma.cc/XJB9-WU6E.

